Love to Bunt

As a followup to my latest article on bunting on THT and as a preview of the next article here's a few numbers on sacrifices that were attempted and successful over the past three seasons (2003-2005). You'll have to read the article to ascertain how sacrifice attempts are counting and the success criteria.

     Att    Succ      Pct
    7252    5550 0.765306

And by position...a subject I discuss more in the next article...

Position     Att    Succ     Pct
       7     356     304   0.854
       9     267     223   0.835
       4     861     719   0.835
       3     137     114   0.832
       6    1006     836   0.831
       8     693     571   0.824
       2     549     451   0.821
      10      84      69   0.821
       5     378     292   0.772
      11     217     161   0.742
       1    2704    1810   0.669

And by inning...

  Inning     Att    Succ     Pct
       1     512     448   0.875
       2     783     562   0.718
       3     998     714   0.715
       4     704     527   0.749
       5     961     705   0.734
       6     683     551   0.807
       7     822     647   0.787
       8     819     638   0.779
       9     588     450   0.765
      10     159     138   0.868
      11     105      73   0.695
      12      57      46   0.807
      13      25      21   0.840
      14      15      13   0.867
      15      15      12   0.800
      16       3       2   0.667
      17       2       2   1.000
      19       1       1   1.000

I also took a look at those who had 20 or more sacrifice attempts in the period. Here they are ranked by percentage...

>=20 Attempts
                        Att    Succ     Pct
Luis Castillo            47      47   1.000
Timo Perez               22      22   1.000
Jerry Hairston           24      23   0.958
Julio Lugo               22      21   0.955
Nook Logan               21      20   0.952
Derek Jeter              41      39   0.951
Deivi Cruz               20      19   0.950
Ryan Freel               19      18   0.947
Alex Cora                30      28   0.933
Miguel Cairo             30      28   0.933
Paul Lo Duca             27      25   0.926
Juan Uribe               34      31   0.912
Omar Vizquel             55      50   0.909
Edgar Renteria           22      20   0.909
Matt Morris              32      29   0.906
Brandon Inge             21      19   0.905
Javier Vazquez           21      19   0.905
Kenny Lofton             21      19   0.905
David Eckstein           40      36   0.900
Luis Gonzalez            20      18   0.900
Michael Tucker           20      18   0.900
Endy Chavez              38      34   0.895
Adam Everett             51      45   0.882
Livan Hernandez          41      36   0.878
Coco Crisp               41      36   0.878
Juan Pierre              57      50   0.877
Tony Womack              32      28   0.875
Jack Wilson              39      34   0.872
Randy Winn               31      27   0.871
Craig Biggio             23      20   0.870
Luis Matos               23      20   0.870
Ramon Santiago           30      26   0.867
Aaron Miles              22      19   0.864
Chone Figgins            35      30   0.857
Russ Ortiz               28      24   0.857
Henry Blanco             21      18   0.857
Andy Pettitte            21      18   0.857
Ramon Martinez           20      17   0.850
Melvin Mora              33      28   0.848
Royce Clayton            50      42   0.840
Angel Berroa             37      31   0.838
Omar Infante             24      20   0.833
Joe McEwing              24      20   0.833
Scott Podsednik          35      29   0.829
Neifi Perez              40      33   0.825
Dave Roberts             28      23   0.821
Tom Glavine              28      23   0.821
Kris Benson              33      27   0.818
Nick Green               22      18   0.818
Claudio Vargas           22      18   0.818
Brian Roberts            32      26   0.813
Marcus Giles             25      20   0.800
Kirk Rueter              20      16   0.800
Roy Oswalt               34      27   0.794
Jason Schmidt            43      34   0.791
Alex Sanchez             52      41   0.788
Brad Ausmus              23      18   0.783
Placido Polanco          23      18   0.783
Ronnie Belliard          23      18   0.783
Brett Tomko              45      35   0.778
Alex Cintron             27      21   0.778
Jeff Suppan              31      24   0.774
Willie Harris            22      17   0.773
Steve Trachsel           30      23   0.767
Woody Williams           30      23   0.767
Jamey Carroll            32      24   0.750
Mike Hampton             24      18   0.750
Jerome Williams          24      18   0.750
Jose Valentin            24      18   0.750
Corey Patterson          24      18   0.750
Kerry Wood               20      15   0.750
Miguel Olivo             20      15   0.750
Jeff Weaver              20      15   0.750
Brad Penny               20      15   0.750
Aaron Cook               20      15   0.750
Randy Wolf               20      15   0.750
Juan Castro              26      19   0.731
Josh Fogg                33      24   0.727
Carlos Zambrano          22      16   0.727
Cristian Guzman          53      38   0.717
Quinton McCracken        21      15   0.714
Cory Lidle               24      17   0.708
Brett Myers              34      24   0.706
Odalis Perez             34      24   0.706
John Thomson             27      19   0.704
Mark Prior               27      19   0.704
Greg Maddux              36      25   0.694
Rafael Furcal            26      18   0.692
Aaron Rowand             26      18   0.692
Oliver Perez             29      20   0.690
Shawn Estes              28      19   0.679
Cesar Izturis            39      26   0.667
Brandon Webb             36      24   0.667
Adam Eaton               24      16   0.667
Kazuhisa Ishii           29      19   0.655
Jake Peavy               29      19   0.655
Ben Sheets               33      21   0.636
John Patterson           22      14   0.636
AJ Burnett               27      17   0.630
Matt Clement             21      13   0.619
Josh Beckett             31      19   0.613
Brian Lawrence           31      19   0.613
Carl Pavano              23      14   0.609
Dontrelle Willis         22      13   0.591
Jason Jennings           26      15   0.577
Chris Carpenter          27      15   0.556
Vicente Padilla          20      11   0.550
Paul Wilson              26      13   0.500
Al Leiter                22      11   0.500
Kevin Millwood           23      11   0.478
Horacio Ramirez          21      10   0.476
Kip Wells                24      11   0.458
Eric Milton              22      10   0.455
Aaron Harang             20       8   0.400
Ramon Ortiz              19       7   0.368
Mark Redman              23       8   0.348
Doug Davis               29       9   0.310

Note that Matt Morris tops the list of pitchers. Interesting that Luis Castillo has been perfect. Stay tuned.

Jacque in Wrigley

David Appleman of FanGraphs has a nice article on THT on the new Cubs Jacque Jones. He shows that Jones decrease in batting average since 2003 has likely been because he's hitting fewer line drives. Interestingly, when he hits fly balls they leave the yard with alarming regularity. The problem is that he's an extreme ground ball hitter. That's not good news for him or the Cubs as he shifts to Wrigley where the grass is high and the alleys short.

Could Be Worse: Cubs 2006

Well, I've held my tongue long enough and so I just have to share my thoughts on the Cubs 2005-2006 offseason thus far.

Signed Glendon Rusch for 2 years at $6M. Not a bad move to sign him as an insurnace policy since he can both start and relieve. Good move.

Picked up options on Todd Walker and Scott Williamson. Both good moves since Walker is probably as good at secondbase as they would have been able to get and Williamson is worth the risk.

Declined option on Jeremy Burnitz and bought him out for $500K. Not a bad move if, and I say again if, you actually have a plan for filling the right field slot. Burnitz had the kind of year you expect from him but he contributes both defensively and on the bases.

Signed Ryan Dempster for 3 years at $15.5M. Probably overpaid for a guy who, to me anyway, just isn't cut out to be a closer. Yes, he had a great run in 2005 but I'll be surprised if we see that out of him again.

Signed Neifi Perez for years and too much money. Why two years? I don't mind having him back as a backup but we all know that Dusty will rely on him in all kinds of situations and he'll bat leadoff or second and do alot of drag bunting...yada yada yada. A bad move based on the two year contract and the fact that he'll take at bats from Ronnie Cedeno who looked good last year and is having a good winter.

Traded John Leceister to the Ranger for a PTBNL. 27 year old that didn't really figure in the Cubs plans. Remains to be seen whether this one is good or bad.

Signed LHP Scott Eyre to two years plus an option for 2008. Now 34 years old and coming off the best season of his career. Look for him to regress. Will Ohman wasn't quite as good last year but probably good enough to eat those innings as the LOOGY.

Signed RHP Bobby Howry to a three year deal. Back to back good seasons in Cleveland and at 32 years old should be good for one or two more. Not a bad deal and makes me wonder why they spent $15.5M on Dempster.

Traded Jermain Van Buren to the Red Sox for a PTBNL. Hard thrower whose strikeout rates increased the last two seasons in AA and AAA. Hope they get somebody decent or this might be a big bust.

Acquired Juan Pierre for Sergio Mitre, Ricky Nolasco, and Renyel Pinto. Nolasco at 22 years old went 14-3 at AA with 173/46 K/BB ratio in 161.7 innings. Pinto has always had more control issues but did fairly well at AA last year (101 hits in 129.7 IP). And of course we all know Mitre has a great arm and could be the Marlins number two starter. This was alot to give up for an outfielder with a .350 SLUG. Major injuries to Mark Prior, Kerry Wood, and/or Carlos Zambrano could have the Cubs wishing they still had these three arms. Too early to tell.

Signed John Mabry to a one-year deal and designated Jose Macias for assignment. Half of this I like. Mabry, on the other hand, struggled last year and probably won't be getting any better at age 35. I've often called for the Cubs to strengthen their bench by acquiring some hitters but this aint it.

Picked up LHP Carlos Jan, RHP Geivy Garcia, and INF Aaron Rifkin in the Rule 5 draft. Then sent Rifkin to the Rockies for a PTBNL. Jan hasn't played above A ball and is a hard thrower with control issues. Garcia has struggled in A ball the last two seasons and isn't going anywhere. We'll see what they get for Rifkin but there are no contributors here. They also lost Juan Mateo who struck out 123 in 109.7 innings and walked only 27 in A-ball last year so it appears the Rule 5 was a net negative this year.

Signed Jacque Jones for three years and $16M. Ouch. I said earlier that it was OK to let Burnitz walk if you had a plan. Obviously they didn't and had to grab what they could. On the wrong side of 30 Jones hasn't played well since 2003 and so I wouldn't expect him to even replace Burnitz's declining Win Shares. Bad idea for one year let alone three.

I also see that they've offered a contract to Corey Patterson since they now need him to compete for the left field job with Matt Murton with Pierre in center and Jones in right. Those four together combine for a pretty weak offensive outfield.

Thus far I'd give Jim Hendry and the gang a C-. Could be worse. And it probably is as Kerry Wood will not be ready by the start of the season. Just waiting for the other shoe (or achilles tendon) to drop regarding the health of Mark Prior.

Projected Opening day lineup
CF Pierre
2B Walker
1B Lee
3B Ramirez
RF Jones
C Barrett
LF Patterson/Murton
SS Cedeno
P Prior

Bunting Redux

Back in May I posted some thoughts about the probability of a successful sacrifice. I've now extended that a little bit in an article posted this morning on THT. Turns out my previous estimate was a little low and sacrifices are probably successful around 76% of the time. Enjoy.

The Crash of 2006?

Last week T.J. Quinn of the New York Daily News wrote an article entitled "Post-steroid era is eye-opener" that discussed the drug issue in baseball in the context of the winter meetings in Dallas.

Interestingly Quinn makes the argument that baseball's new and tougher drug policies are making it more difficult for statistically-minded front offices since it is harder to evaluate players based on statistics.

"With baseball ushering in a new policy for next season - the Players Association approved it unanimously this past week - scouts and executives agree that they are still sorting out the end of baseball's steroid era. Statistics compiled in the years before baseball started incrementally toughening its policy in 2003 are considered suspect, making it tough to plug numbers into a computer to determine a player's value. "

That makes sense since some player's career trajectories have been altered by the use of steroids. With baseball cleaning up its act, it stands to reason that those players who were using performance enhancers and have quit will suffer more precipitous declines in performance than they would have otherwise. This makes a GM's job harder if he's thinking about signing a veteran with an established level of performance.

Quinn then discusses the situation from the perspective of the Mets GM Omar Minaya.

"As for the more immediate problem of evaluating players who might have been doping for years, Minaya, a classic lifelong baseball man with a scouting background, says the tougher anti-doping rules have eliminated some of the guesswork from his job. 'The past couple of years we've been conscious of a potential problem and it seems to be getting rectified,' he said. 'Before, you wondered if a performance was enhanced or not. I trust the numbers the last two years.'"

What's missing here, and what Quinn acknowledges, is that it is still easy to beat baseball's drug policy. Human growth hormone, for example, still cannot be tested for.

However, Quinn believes that the amphetamine policy will have the larger effect.

"The biggest question, some executives said, is how the banishment of amphetamines, announced only last month, will change the game. Players have relied on 'greenies' for decades for an extra boost of energy and intensity. Some players have said they simply cannot get through a six-month, 162-game season without mother's little helper. "

Aside from greenies incorrectly being labeled "mother's little helper", which I think has traditionally been associated with Valium, I think he makes a pretty good point. Greenies have been used by far more players than steroids and so removing them will likely have a greater effect on the player population as a whole.

However, since their effects are generally subtler and since there are negative side effects like decreased appetite and disrupted sleep patterns, players will probably adapt by taking legal stimulants or simply taking better care of themselves. And so statistically speaking I doubt we'll see numbers come crashing down.

One of the hallmarks of humanity is its' ability to adapt and survive. In 1998 some psychologists published a meta-study on childhood sexual abuse. What they found when looking at the subsequent mental health of those who had been abused and comparing it to those who hadn't, was that the difference between the two groups was just two-tenths of a standard deviation. In other words, those had been abused had more problems later in life, but not to the degree that we've been conditioned to expect based on pop-psychology and modern media portrayals of abuse.

This result triggered a firestorm of controversy which even included the United States Congress passing resolutions which condemned the analysis. Why? Because rather than be comforted by the fact that human beings are a resilient species, they saw it as providing ammunition for those who support pedophilia and other morally reprehensible acts. But we can have both. We can be glad that early traumas don't necessarily mean a wrecked psychological life and at the same time condemn acts that are immoral.

The Sixth Tool

Here's an interesting blog that purports to be written by an actual scout using a pseudonym. I have my doubts since the setup is too perfect and the writing too good, but it is well-written and interesting. It highlights the differences between traditional scouting where looking for the "Sixth Tool" is paramount and so-called "performance scouting" which, as the scout "Cutter" Jones says, is mostly hogwash

An analysis of some of the posts was done here.

Absentee Blogger

I haven't been writing as much on this blog in the last week because at Compassion we were in the midst of rolling out some software, which I can happily say, was put into production this morning. For those in IT you might find our little project interesting...

Schwarz on THT

Alan Schwarz wrote a nice piece in The New York Times that gave prominent mention to The Hardball Times and one of our fearless leaders Dave Studeman. What I love about the article is that it illustrates how much disparity there still exists between many baseball insiders subjective valuations of players and what performance analysis would indicate.

"When taken seriously, and asked to assess the victory value of the players they acquired during the industry's annual swap meet, the answers usually sounded like the one Minnesota manager Ron Gardenhire gave when he spoke about his new speedy second baseman, Luis Castillo.

'He's worth 15 wins, potentially,' Gardenhire said of Castillo, a .293 lifetime hitter acquired from the Florida Marlins. 'We lost 30 one-run games last year. With Luis' ability to get on base, steal bases, score runs and play defense, a guy like that can make a difference in at least half those one-run games going the other way.'"

Of course those who are familiar with Win Shares know that 15 wins would be the equivalent to 45 Win Shares, a total that Luis Castillo has never and will never approach. Albert Pujols led the majors in WS with 38 last season with Derrek Lee and Alex Rodriguez tied for second at 37. Last season Castillo totalled 17 WS and as Schwarz points out, that doesn't take into account the Win Shares that any replacement level second baseman would contribute.

It's interesting that the White Sox, a team that you wouldn't think would use performance analysis, use a more analytical approach and estimate that the Jim Thome for Aaron Rowand trade will net them 15 runs (+20 for Thome and -5 for Rowand) or 1.5 wins using the standard 10 runs per win estimate.

Sinister Motives?

I'd like to thank everyone for their feedback regarding my article on Caribbean players over at THT. I was especially interested in a note from Mike Cook who speculated that perhaps lower plate discipline is a product of coaching philosophy towards Caribbean players who are perhaps viewed as not as intelligent as non-Caribbeans. Another thought that was perhaps Caribbean players develop plate discipline over time since they're not exposed to advanced coaching as early in their careers.

As to the latter hypothesis I took a look at Caribbeans and non-Caribbeans from ages 20 through 41 and produced the following graph.



As you can see the difference between the two groups remains pretty steady as both groups age (the sample size gets pretty small for Caribbeans around age 39) and so I think we can discount the second hypothesis. If you're wondering why the walk rate climbs steadily almost to age 40 when generally performance declines as players reach their early thirties, keep in mind that this graph includes all players and so those players who are still playing in their mid to late thirties are "selected" via their better than average performance. In other words, the same set of players is not tracked at each age and so better players are represented on the right end of the graph.

As for the former hypothesis I wouldn't argue against the notion that Caribbean and Latin players may be viewed as less intelligent, primarily because of the language barrier. Moises Alou said as much during the Krueger controversy. However, since the realization that plate discipline is a skill unto itself is relatively new in baseball, I would argue that since the production of the two groups is basically equivalent, coaches in general see no need to focus on plate discipline with Caribbean players.

J.C. Bradbury of Sabernomics fame (who has several excellent articles in The Hardball Times Baseball Annual 2006-buy-yours-today) also made an interesting point when he noted that Caribbean players are less likely to be left-handed and more likely to be switch hitters. I admit that I remembered reading his post but forgot completely about it when putting together the article. Indeed, just as J.C. found, in my study 13.2% of Caribbean players were switch hitters and 14.4% left-handed hitters while for non-Caribbeans it was 7.2% and 28.8% respectively.

Caribbean      Count     Pct      PA     Pct
B                 131   0.132  232865   0.215
R                 717   0.724  705547   0.651
L                 143   0.144  146075   0.135
                  991         1084487        

Non-Caribbean  Count     Pct      PA     Pct
B                 469   0.072  682139   0.116
R                4154   0.640 3221848   0.546
L                1868   0.288 1992907   0.338
                 6491         5896894           

Overall 11% of the world population (and yours truly) is left-handed and those of Hispanic lineage (which overlaps considerably with my population of Caribbean players) are less likely (9.1%) to be sinister (the Latin word for "left" is sinstre) than dextral ("just" or "right" in Latin). Of course that small difference doesn't explain the much larger difference you see in players from the Caribbean. Many people have pondered this question and it would seem that the cultural bias against lefties in the Caribbean is likely the largest contributing factor. Players forced to write right-handed are therefore more likely to become switch hitters when they start playing baseball. A lesser factor might be related to position bias where more Caribbeans gravitate to middle-infield positions which are traditionally manned by righties.

Following this line of reasoning J.C. offered that since Caribbean hitters more often hit with the platoon advantage they might walk less and hit with a higher average as a result.

In a different study I'm doing of platoon advantage I found that hitters with the platoon advantage do indeed walk less frequently (actually .0013 walks per plate appearance less) than do hitters when they don't have the platoon advantage. They also hit for a higher average (+.024) when they have the advantage. In that study, however, I didn't include switch hitters which is very relevant here.

Using the table above and estimating that 30% of the plate appearances in the majors are against left-handed pitching Caribbean hitters actually hit with the platoon advantage 50.4% of the time while non-Caribbean do so 51.6% of the time. The reason for this is that Caribbeans include 8.4% more "pure" right-handed hitters (with pure in quotes since doubtless many of those are lefties like my Dad who were forced to be right-handed and then never returned from the Dark Side). So it would appear that platoon advantage doesn't really explain the difference.

Take a Walk...

My article on the Krueger/Alou controversy has been posted on THT. It takes a look at the group differences in offensive performance between Caribbean and non-Caribbean players.

Also had a nice surprise when I found that Rob Neyer mentioned one of my articles in The Hardball Times Baseball Annual 2006 where he says:

"In 'The Hardball Times Baseball Annual 2006', contributor Dan Fox does something that I've never seen anybody do before: He puts together the wins and losses that we would expect from the run differentials and the underlying events that generally lead to runs scored and allowed.

I won't present the method in any great detail -- Fox's article runs for several pages, and anyway, you should buy the book (which also contains, among other things, a couple of articles by Bill James and a modest essay by your humble columnist) -- but the results are worth mentioning."

As I mentioned in the article I can't take credit for the idea since I lifted it from Phil Birnbaum's presentation at this year's SABR conference in Toronto. Phil looked at the role of luck retrospectively and also included pitchers and hitters having outlier or "career years".

Congrats!

I just saw that Tracy Ringsolsby has been honored by the Baseball Writers Association of America with the Spink Award. I met Tracy for the first time last season while scoring for MLB.com since he and his cowbody hat often occupied the seat next to mine on the front row of the press box. He's always very pleasant and you can tell the other writers and club personel greatly respect him. This honor is well-deserved, heck, helping found Baseball America in and of itself is enough.

I don't always agree with his takes, especially when it comes to the role and value of performance analysis, but I always appreciate his great writing.

Here is the AP story.

DALLAS (AP) - Tracy Ringolsby of the Rocky Mountain News, a pioneer in baseball labor coverage and also among the first writers to concentrate on scouting, won the J.G. Taylor Spink Award on Wednesday from the Baseball Writers'
Association of America.

Ringolsby will be honored for meritorious contributions to baseball writing during the induction ceremonies in July at the baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, N.Y. He received 225 votes from BBWAA members to 128 for Joe Goddard of the Chicago Sun-Times and 76 for the late Vern Plagenhoef of Michigan's Booth Newspaper Group.

Ringolsby has covered baseball for 30 years, 28 as a beat reporter and two as a national writer. He has worked for the Denver paper since 1992, covering the inaugural season of the Colorado Rockies, and previously worked for United Press International, the Press-Telegram in Long Beach, Calif., the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, The Kansas City Star and The Dallas Morning News.
Ringolsby has worked to have scouts recognized by the Hall of Fame and was also one of the founders of Baseball America, a publication focused on player development and scouting. He covered the grievance hearing of Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally, which led to free agency in baseball.

Playing the Infield In

I'm sure if you've watched much baseball you've heard it said that with the infield in a hitter's average goes up 100 points...or 75 points...or something like that. In any case the conventional wisdom is that batting average goes up significantly when the defense is attempting to prevent a critical run from scoring by positioning their infielders close.

John Walsh's excellent articles on THT prompted me to take a quick look at just how true the conventional wisdom is using play by play data for 2003-2005. The problem is that PBP data does not contain indicators that say "infield was in" on this or that particular play. So we'll have to make some guesses as to when the infield is likely to be in. This too is fraught with difficulty since when you think about it, teams play their defenses in a variety of configurations from double play depth, to in at the corners and DP depth up the middle, in at the corners and half-way up the middle, to all the way in. In fact, in thinking about it I don't have a good feel for how often managers actually bring their infields in - a case of not actually observing what it is you're seeing I suppose.

In any case I took at stab at identifying those situations where the infield was likely to be in. They were:

Runners on third, or second and third, less than 2 outs, with a -3 to 0 run differential in the fifth inning or later

Runners on at least first and third, less than 2 outs, with a -2 to 0 run differential in the 8th inning or later

In other words I'm assuming that teams don't play the infield in when they have a lead, when they're down by a number of runs, or before the fifth inning, and that they would go for the double play before the 6th inning. In both cases I'm looking at all balls that were put in play excluding bunts.

So to make the comparison I looked at batted ball outcomes by trajectory in these situations and when these situations didn't apply. First, let's take a look at the non infield-in situations.

traj        tot     pct     out       s       d       t      hr       h      sf       e
F         113815   28.3%   73.2%    5.6%    8.1%    1.2%   11.9%   26.8%    3.0%    0.2%
G         179978   44.7%   76.5%   21.4%    2.0%    0.1%    0.0%   23.5%    0.0%    2.5%
L          76351   19.0%   26.5%   51.8%   17.6%    1.5%    2.5%   73.5%    0.0%    0.1%
P          32670    8.1%   98.1%    1.5%    0.4%    0.0%    0.0%    1.9%    0.0%    0.3%
          402814           67.9%   21.1%    6.5%    0.7%    3.8%   32.1%    1.0%    1.2%

As you can see out of 400,000 batted balls 67.9% were turned into outs. The highest percentage turned into outs were popups and the lowest was line drives.

Now let's take a look at the outcomes in infield-in situations.

traj        tot     pct     out       s       d       t      hr       h      sf       e
F            953   28.4%   76.4%    8.3%    6.4%    1.0%    7.9%   23.6%   60.1%    0.1%
G           1555   46.4%   73.6%   24.1%    2.2%    0.1%    0.0%   26.4%    0.0%    3.2%
L            551   16.4%   16.7%   60.4%   18.5%    1.6%    2.7%   83.3%    0.2%    0.0%
P            295    8.8%   98.0%    2.0%    0.0%    0.0%    0.0%    2.0%    0.7%    0.0%
            3354           67.2%   23.6%    5.9%    0.6%    2.7%   32.8%   17.2%    1.5%

What's interesting is that the percentage of balls turned into outs is essentially the same, just .7% lower at 67.2%. Interestingly, the line drive hit rate climbs from 73.5% in other situations to 83.3% in infield-in situations. This indicates that the advantage for the hitter with the infield in lies in poking line drives through the drawn in infield. You can also see that the hit rate for ground balls goes up three percent to 26.4% as more hard hit grounders scoot between infielders. This is what you would expect.

The most surprising aspect of this analysis is that fly balls are converted into outs over 3% more often in infield-in situations than in others. That difference can be explained by the 4% drop in homeruns that accompany the infield-in situations. As Walsh pointed out in his article what is likely going on here is that hitters knowingly sacrifice power in these situations in order to put the ball in play since simply hitting a fly ball gives them over an 80% chance of scoring the runner from third. You can also see this to a lesser degree with line drives where hitters hit fewer line drives with the infield drawn in and more ground balls. Another factor to be considered is that pitchers pitch more carefully with runners on base and so are less likely to challenge hitters with pitches, that when they miss, are driven out of the yard.

So what about our question? Well, let's take fly balls out of the picture since they are likely governed both by hitter intent and pitcher reticence. When totalling the balls in play on the ground and line drives outcomes, hitters have a .384 chance of getting a hit in other situations and a .413 chance with the infield in - a 30 point difference. That's not as much of a bump as you might suppose.

However, that assumes that all fly balls are counted against the hitter. In infield-in situations 60% of those flyballs are counted as sacrifice flies and therefore don't count against the hitter's average. This quirk of the rule book that many would like to see eliminated means that a hitter's actual batting average goes up much more significantly. A second factor is that batters do indeed strike out less frequently with the infield-in which raises their batting average as well. Walsh ran the numbers for me and found that overall the batting average is .265 and that in the infield-in situations it's .348, an 83 point difference. When sac flies are counted as outs the average is .300. So over half the 83 point increase is due to the sac fly rule while half is due to the combination of defense alignment (more balls getting through the infield) and batters putting the ball in play more often.

And that's about what you would expect. Teams play the infield in not because it affords a better chance of getting the batter out, but because it raises the probability that the runner on third will have to remain on third or get thrown out at the plate.

So the conventional wisdom is superficially correct in that batting average does go up with the infield in. But when you dig a litter deeper you find that hitters don't stand a significantly better overall chance of getting a hit with the infield in.

Executive Database

Another little tibit. Baseball America has now published a very cool Executive Database. It contains the members of the Baseball Operations departments of teams since 1960 and general managers going back to 1950.

Now if they would only give us an XML or csv feed so we could run some interesting GM comparisons...

Modifying Their Approach

John Walsh has published a couple nice articles on THT. In the first he looks at whether batters can and so change their approach with a runner on third and less than two outs in order to score the runner on a sacrifice fly. He concludes that:

"...as a group batters do seem to be able to change their approach at the plate to increase the probability of getting a fly ball to score a run in a sacrifice fly situation. However, the increase in fly balls comes simply from putting more balls in play (by striking out and walking less often) and not by batters putting more of their batted balls into the air."

So batters don't really hit more fly balls but they do put the ball in play more often. He also notes that 60% of fly balls in these situations will result in sacrifice flies while less than 1% of line drives do. The major reason for this, as Walsh notes, is that three quarters of all line drives go for hits. A second reason is that a decent percentage of line drives will be caught in the infield. But the biggest reason I think is that based on my own experience, scorers are biased towards recording balls hit to the outfield as fly balls. It's difficult when sitting in the press box to make accurrate determinations in regards to trajectory on many hard hit balls to the outfield and the default position is to record it as a line drive. Or maybe it's just me.

In the second article Walsh looked at whether it's a good idea for hitters to change their approach in sacrifice fly situations. Although he finds that at first glance hitters are indeed more productive in SF situations using RC they are not (and this is my favorite part and a great insight) when the defensive context is taken into account. To consider the context, Walsh showed that batted balls turn into hits more frequently in SF situations, a result he credits to the "defensive alignment employed by teams with a runner on third and fewer than two outs." I assume that the vast majority of that alignment relates to playing the infield in. The difference Walsh finds is on the order of 1.5% for ground balls and .93% for line drives. Overall batted balls are turned into outs 29.9% of the time in SF situations and 28.3% in non-SF situations. This difference is not as large as I would have thought. Of course, this study doesn't attempt to look only at situations where the infield is in.

When he then corrects for this hitters in SF situations create .3 runs less per 27 outs in SF situations than in non SF situations. His conclusion is as follows:

"What I've tried to do here is answer the question 'Is the 'contact-oriented' approach generally more productive than the standard approach?" The answer appears to be 'no,' as can be seen after translating the aggregate performance in sac fly situations into a defense-independent context."

Two Unrelated Things

I'll be offline for much of the weekend and so wanted to leave you with these two tidbits that have no relationship to one another in any way that I can find.

First, David Pinto reminded me that the Baseball Hall of Fame has this very cool site where you can view baseball uniforms throughout the ages. Very interesting to take a look back at the bad old days of the late 70s.

Secondly, one of the things we have always enjoyed about Colorado Springs, and more so since we moved here, is the Flying W Wranglers, a western/gospel band that has a place out here where you can go for dinner and a concert. Well, the group is splitting up as three of the members want to pursue a more openly evangelical approach. The good news is that the Wranglers will go on and will remain a family-friendly place to go.

Hardball Times Baseball Annual 2006

The Hardball Times Baseball Annual 2006 has shipped and I received my copies just yesterday. Dave Studeman, Aaron Gleeman, and the folks at ACTA did an outstanding job of putting the book together which contains all original content (no web article reprints) including articles by Bill James, Rob Neyer, John Dewan, and J.C. Bradbury among others and of course a number of articles by the regular THT crew.

I think you'll really like the additional information on batted ball outcomes and the articles by Studeman, Bradbury and THT's David Glassko that analyzes it. You can read a review of the book here by Stick and Ball Guy.

Yours truly has two articles in the book, one on lucky and unlucky teams for 2005 and the results of my baserunning analysis. The stats section includes the baserunning results for every player in the majors last season. Enjoy.

Sabermetrics Course

Thought some readers might be interested in this article, "Numbers crunch: Tufts course really packs 'em in" that discusses the class offered at Tufts titled EX-013, The Analysis of Baseball: Statistics and Sabermetrics and taught by SABR members Andy Andres and David Tybor, and Morgan Melchiorre.

Very cool indeed. Why couldn't I take that kind of class in college? I'm also proud to report that this site is listed on their links section.

History Repeating Itself

SABR's Paul Wendt posted a pdf of a fascinating article by F.C. Lane titled "Has the 'lively' Ball Revolutionized the Game?" The article appeared in the September 1921 issue of Baseball Magazine.

I've written about F.C. Lane before, a man who was in many ways ahead of his time (particularly in his understanding of performance analysis), and you can read about his fascinating book Batting here.

As was the case with many in and around the game during this period, Lane grew up when pitching dominated and so it's not surprising that he viewed the exploits of Christy Matthewson, Smokey Joe Wood, and Walter Johnson as normative and was alarmed at the era that Ruth was then ushering in. In this article Lane writes about what he considers the "foremost problem in baseball today."

He puts it this way.

"And since we all know that pitching is the bed rock of baseball, when we disturb the foundation of the game, we shake the superstructure."

Because of his knowledge and reverence for statistics he also rightly compares the inflation of batting statistics to the devaluation of currency during the war - a problem our own generation is now coping with in the "Lively Player Era". The article then explores the various reasons given for the devaluation.

Lane begins by reporting on his investigation of the ball itself in order to quelch the rumors that it is being manufactured differently and that the owners are responsible - a charge by the way that is recounted by Leonard Koppett in his book The Thinking Fan's Guide to Baseball in chapter 28 where he says that in "1920 the ball was made livlier again...That bit of history is well known." Apparently Lane would have disagreed.

In any case Lane toured both Reach (the ball used in the AL) and Spalding (that used in the NL) factories and concluded that the balls themselves were manufactured in exactly the same way, albeit with better materials and particularly better quality and more elastic yarn since the end of the war. He also specifically dismissed those who claimed that the balls were being made livlier on purpose, reporting on his interviews with the league presidents. In the end his conclusion on the manufacture of the balls was that:

"The ball in use in both major leages is actually somewhat livlier than it was during the war period due to better materials and possibly better workmanship. But there is no evidence of any great change in the ball itself from year to year."

He then went on to discuss the four other factors he saw as also contributing and that in sum were more important than differences in the ball itself.

Inferior quality of pitching. He seemed to view this as a random fluctuation effect and quotes Ty Cobb as saying that the pitchers were just having a down year in 1921. In retrospect, the offensive surge that began in 1920 and continued largely until WW II, renders this explanation obsolete. The increase in offense was not random as it might have been in 1987 (probably attributable to weather), but rather was a systemic change in the game. This can be seen graphically here where runs per game jumps in 1920 and doesn't again reach deadball levels until 1968.

A general "handicap of pitching" by the new rules. This included the abolition of the spit ball and all "freak deliveries", by which Lane meant meant scuffed, emery, and "shine" balls. These were all banned in the wake of the death of Ray chapman at the hands of a Carl Mays fastball in August of 1920. Of course today we would group all of these in the category of doctored balls but it shows how spitball pitchers were viewed more as craftsman and a legitimate part of the game. As Koppett also notes, Lane mentions that damaged balls had begun being thrown out by the umpires resulting in harder and whiter balls being put in play, a practice that has reached an almost absurd level in the last decade.

Changes in managerial methods. Here Lane discusses how managers are adapting to the higher offensive levels by not calling for the sacrifice and stolen base and instead allowing hitters to hit away. This, Lane notes as many sabermetricians have in the last quarter century, leads to increased offensive output and more runs being scored.

More "sheer slugging at the ball in an effort to bang out homeruns". Finally, Lane attributes much of the difference to players now trying to hit homeruns or "slug" in the parlance of the day in order to emulate Ruth. Lane also discusses this trend in his book Batting and quotes Ty Cobb as saying:

"Ruth is more than a slugger, he is a homerun hitter. Fortunately for him, he began as a pitcher. A pitcher is not expected to hit. Therefore, he can follow his own system without managerial interference. Ruth made the most of this opportunity...I have tried to make myself a batter, which is something quite different. A batter is a man who can bunt, place his hits, beat out infield drives, and slug when the occasion demands it, but he doesn't slug all the time."

To me, and contrary to Koppett who views changes in the ball as most important, this factor is the first among equals. In Batting Lane also attributes Ruth's ability to hit homeruns and others ability to follow his example to adopting a particular style or "speciality" of hitting rather than the influence of different baseballs. The style that Ruth popularized along with the fact that the reluctance of owners to make rules that handicapped Ruth in light of the Black Sox scandal served to usher in the new slugger's era.

In conclusion Lane then discussed what he saw as minor contributing factors. He mentioned that it was becoming more common for fans to keep foul balls where once they were forced to return them which had the consequence of introducing many new balls into play. He also noted that the transition to the new pitching rules had caused pitchers to temporarily fall behind in the arms race and that soon they would develop new strategies to cope. The latter introduction of the slider and the resurgence of the knuckleball are two examples of how pitchers did finally adapt. Finally, he also mentions that hitters had grown in confidence from the abolition of the freak deliveries, which in the past had them more fearful of injuries.

In the end Lane I think correctly attributes the rise in offense to, for him, this unhappy confluence of factors and seems to look forward to the day when pitching would regain prominance. There is a parallel here to our own day where the confluence of factors including weight training, steroids, perhaps lower seems on the ball, the effect of aluminum bats on the training of pitchers, and the abscence of intimidation among others, have all contributed to higher offensive output. And as in those days there are those like Koppett who continue to believe that the ball was made livlier starting in 1993 despite tests that shows the coefficient of restitution hasn't changed.

Dinner with Rocky Mountain SABR

Last Saturday night my daughter and I drove into Denver for the annual Rocky Mountain SABR banquet (did I ever mention you should join SABR?). The dinner was held at the Denver Athletic Club and attended by around 25 members and their spouses and a few children. The event is sponsored by the Rockies and included silent and live auctions as well as four speakers with the keynote delivered by Jim Burris, a baseball establishment in the Denver area.

When I was a member of the Monarchs SABR chapter in Kansas City I was impressed with the level of speakers they were able to get including Allard Baird, Brian McRae, and John Wathan at their annual mid-winter meeting but having a dinner with the same quality was even better.

The program was led off by Ed Henderson who is the local baseball guru on ESPN radio 560 out of Denver and who was an area scout for the Marlins in the 90s and now with the Pirates. I believe he signed Roy Halladay, Shawn Chacon, and Brad Lidge among others. Henderson spoke eloquently about our shared passion and reminisced about his first trip to Fenway Park and his chance to see Ted Williams - alas a chance he missed as the game was rained out. He also spoke about his trip to the 1999 All Star game and how great it was to see Williams on the field.


Next up was Rockies radio broadcaster Jack Corrigan. Corrigan spoke on a range of subjects including Irish influence in the game from John McGraw, Connie Mack, and Joe McCarthy to Ed Delahanty and King Kelley. He also reminisced about his chance to see Teddy Ballgame at the end of his career when his dad took him to old Municipal Stadium in Cleveland. After a Williams at bat his dad turned to him and said, "now there's a hitter", and nothing else. Corrigan was also pretty optimistic about the Rockies chances in the next few years and drew a parallel with the Indians of the early 1990s. He thinks the Rockies are doing the right thing in focusing on a youth movement and noted that three of the top nine vote getters in the Rookie of the Year award were Rockies (Garrett Atkins, Clint Barmes, and Jeff Francis). Corrigan was most upbeat about the pitching and noted that in the next few years we'll all be much more familiar with the Latin surnames like Carvajal.

He also said, however, that the Rockies chances begin and end with Todd Helton. I disagree. Helton's monster contract at $12.6M in 2005 and rising is an albatross for a team that will likely have a payroll less than $60M in 2006. His translated batting line for 2005 of .303/.431/.518 is very good but not worth more than 20% of the payroll, especially at first base where an adequate replacement in Ryan Shealy awaits. Helton has been a wonderful player but the diminishing returns (he'll turn 32 next season) on the contract that pays him an average of $15.7M per year through 2011 indicate that the Rockies would be better off to try and trade him if any takers could be found. The problem with that strategy of course is that he is their only marketable player at the moment until Matt Holliday, Brad Hawpe or someone else becomes a star (don't count on it being Clint Barmes).

Finally, he mentioned the rumor that the Rockies and Marlins are talking about the possibility of bringing Paul LoDuca to Denver. While at first blush that sounds interesting since the Rockies are in need of catching and the Monforts (the owners) have talked about finding a veteran catcher, there would probably be a tendency to over pay for LoDuca because of his name recognition and it would be foolish to give up some of the young pitching talent for him. In 2006 he'll be five years removed from his outlier year of 2001 where he hit .320/.374/.543. Since then he's been more like .280/.335/.400 which isn't bad for a catcher but nothing to give up the farm for. He'll also be 34. Not a good age for a catcher.

Next at the podium was the national president of SABR John Zajc. He spoke briefly about the accomplishments of SABR over the past year and how the organization now stands at 6,972 members and is poised to top 7,000 for the second time in its history. He also mentioned that in addition to several retired players who are members there is one active pitcher who is a member whose name I didn't catch.

At this point member Paul Parker was given the annual award for his contributions to the chapter. Paul is employed by the Rockies and is the Manager of the Community Fields Program and also the Club Historian. He's been instrumental in getting the Rockies support for the chapter which includes assisting with a project to place plaques at the various sites professional baseball was played in the Denver area. The first plaque will go up at the site of old Mile High Stadium where the Denver Bears played for so many years.

Before Jim Burris took the stage Paul wrapped up the silent and live auctions by auctioning off four signed baseball bats. A signed Cal Ripken bat went for $170, a Mike Schmidt for $160, and a Willie Mays for $700. The final bat was one signed by 30 members of the 1969 Mets which started at $525 but didn't get any takers. All the proceeds from the auction went to The Colorado Rockies Museum and Learning Center. The center will feature exhibits on baseball in the Rockies as well as traveling exhibits from the Baseball Hall of Fame. A learning center is planned as well, so that baseball fans of all ages may learn more about their favorite sport. My daughter bid a few dollars on a set of 2004 Sky Sox cards which she won in the silent auction.

Burris enjoyed a long career in baseball and was GM of both the Denver Bears and Denver Broncos, assistant to Ford Frick, President of the American Association and Texas League, as well as being a journalist. His talk consisted of a series of anecdotes about individuals he's known including Dizzy Dean, Pee Wee Reese (whom he considered his best friend in the game), Paul Richards (knew more about baseball than anyone else), Carl Hubbell (whom he visited in a home in Mesa Arizona in the 1980s and was able to get some help for), Billy Martin (who managed for him Denver), and Rogers Hornsby (a guy that nobody liked but that he got along with).

While some of the anecdotes were well known others were more personal. For example, he told of how Martin called him in 1968 and asked if he could throw a party for his players at the close of the season. Burris said that would be fine and he could spend $500. Martin, however, instead of throwing the party after the final game in Indianapolis threw it the night before. Burris was surprised to get a call from the Indianapolis GM who couldn't believe that even with the party and possibly hungover players, the Bears still beat his ballclub 11-2.

He also told of how he once asked Paul Richards which pitcher he'd like on the mound if he had to win one game. Richards answer was Car Hubbell.

The night ended too soon but it was great to be among other folks who so enjoy and care about the game.

Apply Now

Earlier this year I wrote an article for THT on "A Day in the Life of a Stringer."

There I discussed what it was like to work for MLB.com inputting data for their Gameday system. In the offseason MLB.com usually lists jobs for stringers and writers on Monster.com and recently published a nice article to promote it and describe some of what it's like to work in that environment.

I didn't have any foul ball experiences quite as interesting as Greg's (the closest was about 10 feet from me) but can vouch for the coolness of the job.

Better Late Than...

As you probably already know Major League Baseball and the player's association agreed on a tougher drug policy today. In short the policy goes like this (from the SI story).

Steroid Penalties

• First positive test -- 50-game suspension, up from 10 days.
• Second positive test -- 100-game suspension, up from 30 days.
• Third positive test -- Lifetime ban, with player having right to apply for reinstatement after two years and an arbitrator being able to review reinstatement decision. Under the previous agreement, the earliest a player could be suspended for life was for a fifth positive test.

Amphetamine Penalties (There was no testing for amphetamines in previous agreement)

• First positive test -- Mandatory additional testing.
• Second positive -- 25-game suspension.
• Third positive -- 80-game suspension.
• Fourth positive -- Commissioner's discretion, with an arbitrator being able to review. Testing frequency

What's most interesting about this in my opinion isn't the tougher steroid rules. Those were pretty much a foregone conclusion given that Selig had proposed them in the spring and that congressional action would have resulted had the union not acquiesced.

As an aside Senator Jim Bunning apparently would still like records to be stricken for those who are caught. Although baseball's statistics are more discrete than those in other team sports, the notion that you could somehow make sense of a statistical record where some players records are excised is nonsensical. Bunning has served his purpose in this debacle and it's time for him to sit down and be satisfied that the pressure he tried to apply worked. After all, there is no way the union would have agreed to this or any other policy had the hearing in March not shown how poorly baseball has dealt with the problem.

And speaking of baseball's dismal record, that brings me to the amphetamines penalties. If you think baseball has been tardy on steroids, drugs that have plagued the game for a dozen years or so, widespread amphetamine use in the majors goes back at least 40 years and there has never been any testing or penalties. In fact, Selig himself said in a news conference earlier this year "that he first heard about amphetamines when he walked into the Milwaukee Braves' clubhouse in 1958." Talk about your denial. They were banned in Olympic competition over 35 years ago.

It should be noted that baseball banned the stimulant ephedra after Oriole's pitcher died in 2003 but didn't take the opportunity to add greenies to the list.

One of the ways I've been mourning the end of the baseball season has been to read. And what I picked up to read is Jim Bouton's Ball Four. I bought a paperback copy some years ago at a book sale and always told myself I'd get around to reading it. As most fans know it was Bouton's book that first openly discussed the use of "greenies" by players. Just tonight I ran across this passage:

"At dinner Don Mincher, Marty Pattin, and I discussed greenies. They came up because [John] O'Donoghue had just received a season supply of 500. 'They ought to last about a month',I said.

Mincher was a football player in high school and he said, 'If I had greenies in those days, I'd have been something else.'

'Minch, how many major league ballplayers do you think take greenies?' I asked. 'Half? More?'

'Hell, a lot more than half', he said. 'Just about the whole Baltimore team takes them. Most of the Tigers. Most of the guys on this club. And that's just what I know for sure.'"

Apparently Bunning was asked about the use of greenies in his day (1955-1971) on ESPN radio this morning and he said that he had never seen them in the clubhouse during his playing days. Right.

I find that hard to believe since Bouton, Bill Lee, Dwight Gooden, Tug McGraw, and David Wells have written about their use while Dale Berra and Dave Parker testified that they received amphetamines from Willie Stargell and Bill Madlock. John Milner even testified he got a stimulant from Willie Mays himself.

Long overdue is all I can say.

More Errors

Since I posted some data on reaching on errors the other day I thought I'd share the 2003-2005 leaders with 10 or more.

2005                   2004                 2003
Jason Kendall     15   Miguel Tejada   16   Ty Wigginton     15
Freddy Sanchez    13   Ichiro Suzuki   15   Aaron Boone      14
Jose Reyes        12   Albert Pujols   14   Craig Biggio     13
Grady Sizemore    11   Derek Jeter     13   Cristian Guzman  12
Jack Wilson       11   Juan Pierre     13   Miguel Tejada    12
Carlos Beltran    11   Alex Rodriguez  12   Marquis Grissom  11
Derek Jeter       11   Brian Roberts   12   Dave Roberts     11
Chone Figgins     10   Luis Castillo   12   Joe Randa        11
Craig Biggio      10   Mark Loretta    11   Ken Harvey       11
Craig Counsell    10   Carl Crawford   11   Kenny Lofton     10
Adrian Beltre     10   Angel Berroa    11   Jose Vidro       10
Alfonso Soriano   10   Chipper Jones   11   Juan Pierre      10
Gary Sheffield    10   Keith Ginter    10   Ichiro Suzuki    10
Garrett Atkins    10   Jeff Kent       10   Casey Blake      10
Jose Guillen      10   Edgar Renteria  10   Vinny Castilla   10
Johnny Damon      10   Ron Belliard    10   Scott Podsednik  10
Rafael Furcal     10
Willy Taveras     10

NL MVP Shenanigans

I've held off for a long time in discussing the NL MVP race but now that the voting is complete I can go ahead and share my thoughts.

For those who haven't seen it Albert Pujols won with the following vote totals:

       1st 2nd 3rd Total
Pujols  18  14  0   378
Jones   13  17  2   351
Lee      1   1 30   263

Overall I don't have any problem with Pujols winning the award over Derrek Lee. After all, Pujols created 142 runs and totaled 38 win shares while Lee created 144 runs and was credited with 37 win shares. They both play first base and Pujols was 3 runs above average while Lee was 14 over. In Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) Pujols was at 10.7 while Lee was at 12.3. I also have Lee a couple runs better in baserunning than Pujols.

All told Lee was the better player in terms of creating and preventing runs but Pujols did play on a winning team and that certainly should count for something. Basically, in my view they were close enough to allow the nod to go to Pujols (and because I don't want to upset my friend Jon who is a Cardinals fan).

What everyone is commenting on of course is that Andruw Jones came in second. I'm not even that concerned that he did but that he received 17 second place votes while Lee received just one is a travesty. There simply isn't a rational justification for that result.

Jones created just 90 runs and had 23 win shares.

Jones played a more important defensive position but relatively speaking contributed less there as he was +2 in fielding runs above average.

Overall his WARP was 7.9, 36% less than Lee.

Although I'm not a big believer in the reality of clutch hitting, some voters are and Jones hit poorly in the clutch (.207 with runners in scoring position).

In many rankings he barely breaks the top 20 in the National League. In fact you could make the argument that Jeff Francouer was more valuable to the Braves in getting them to playoffs and certainly that Rafael Furcal was (he had a WARP of 8.2 and 27 win shares) or even perhaps John Smoltz (18 win shares).

Jones came in second for two reasons - 51 homeruns and potential realized. As for the first, in a day and age where there is so much information available for voters it seems strange that as a group they would be caught like a deer in the headlights staring at one number. It's even more inexplicable since that number, in an age of high offensive totals, is relatively low.

More importantly, however, I think many voters and fans generally have had very high expectation of Jones since he made a splash in the 1996 post season. They've expected him to win multiple homerun titles and MVPs and have been at a bit of a loss to explain why he hasn't. Therefore with a great sigh of relief it seemed natural when he made a run this season and so they probably viewed him in a more positive light than his actual contribution would dictate.

Be that as it may, anyway you slice it he simply wasn't the second most valuable player in the league.

Fishing Expeditions

I'd like to thank everyone who gave me feedback on my article on matchups at THT and thought I'd take this opportunity to answer the two most frequently asked questions.

First, several readers pointed out that since I tested over 30,000 outcomes I would expect a certain percentage of those to be in the statistically significant range. In other words, since I expected some low probability outcomes, how can I assign any significance to them in terms of the model not holding? i.e. by concluding that Brian Anderson has some ability to get Garrett Anderson out that the model doesn't capture.

I admit that I didn't catch the issue behind the question immediately but the questioners make an excellent point. Because I was on a "fishing expedition" as the statisticians say I was likely to find some results that were improbable. As a result we can't conclude that the low p-value matchups are necessarily evidence of some ability of a hitter to mash a particular pitcher or a pitcher to flummox a particular hitter. However, I would say that these low p-value matchups are more likely to be those where the model doesn't hold and so a judicious manager could rightly use that data to make pinch hitting decisions.

When statisticians go on a fishing expedition like this they often use a more strict standard of proof rather than the typical p value of .05. One technique to lower the standard is to apply the Bonferroni correction. This simple technique says that if we are testing n outcomes instead of a single outcome, we divide our alpha level by n. So instead of looking at .05 we would look at .05/30,481. What that produces however is a really really small p-value which none of the 30,481 matchups were under. In other words, none would be significant under the most conservative correction. In the battle of the Andersons Garrett would have had to have gone 0-33 against Brian in order to reach this level.

A more liberal application of the Bonferroni correction lowers the p-value to .01 and when that is done there are 133 matchups that fall under this level. Here they are sorted by p-value.

Hitter             Pitcher            AB   H     Avg  HitAvg PitchAvg  ExAvg    p-value
Larry Bigbie       Andy Pettitte      14  11   0.786   0.276   0.247   0.256   0.000051
Garret Anderson    Brian Anderson     22   0   0.000   0.300   0.299   0.335   0.000127
Michael Young      Brandon Backe      10   9   0.900   0.317   0.267   0.318   0.000235
Bill Mueller       Mike Mussina       23   0   0.000   0.303   0.264   0.301   0.000269
Marcus Giles       Jason Schmidt      14  10   0.714   0.305   0.214   0.248   0.000318
Preston Wilson     Jae Seo             6   6   1.000   0.268   0.270   0.271   0.000395
Preston Wilson     Byung-Hyun Kim     10   8   0.800   0.268   0.253   0.254   0.000465
Enrique Wilson     Pedro Martinez     13   8   0.615   0.214   0.219   0.174   0.000465
Jose Reyes         Jon Lieber         13  10   0.769   0.277   0.280   0.292   0.000505
Mark Grudzielanek  Tim Hudson          6   6   1.000   0.304   0.250   0.286   0.000547
Derrek Lee         Mark Mulder        15  11   0.733   0.295   0.266   0.294   0.000558
Matt Holliday      Woody Williams      6   6   1.000   0.299   0.263   0.296   0.000671
Aubrey Huff        Jon Lieber         13  10   0.769   0.290   0.280   0.305   0.000756
Todd Helton        Damian Moss         7   7   1.000   0.343   0.288   0.367   0.000897
Clint Barmes       Odalis Perez       12   9   0.750   0.289   0.259   0.282   0.001022
Reggie Sanders     David Weathers      5   5   1.000   0.272   0.260   0.266   0.001327
David Bell         Gary Majewski       7   6   0.857   0.253   0.264   0.251   0.001365
Charles Johnson    Jake Peavy          6   5   0.833   0.230   0.230   0.197   0.001499
Rondell White      Jake Westbrook     19   0   0.000   0.289   0.265   0.288   0.001588
David Dellucci     Kevin Brown        14   9   0.643   0.242   0.265   0.241   0.001607
Mark Kotsay        Jamie Moyer        21  13   0.619   0.288   0.267   0.288   0.001621
Alfonso Soriano    John Lackey        26   1   0.038   0.280   0.271   0.285   0.001876
Adrian Beltre      Dontrelle Willi     9   7   0.778   0.277   0.254   0.264   0.001923
Brad Wilkerson     Mike Matthews       7   6   0.857   0.257   0.278   0.268   0.001981
Matt LeCroy        Nate Robertson     15  10   0.667   0.273   0.274   0.280   0.002075
Mark Sweeney       Adam Eaton         11   8   0.727   0.277   0.261   0.271   0.002131
Jermaine Dye       Jarrod Washburn    24  13   0.542   0.253   0.266   0.252   0.002278
Aaron Rowand       Tim Wakefield       9   7   0.778   0.288   0.251   0.272   0.002322
David Ortiz        Bartolo Colon      18   0   0.000   0.297   0.255   0.285   0.002385
Jeff Cirillo       Javier Vazquez      6   5   0.833   0.234   0.250   0.218   0.002427
Kevin Millar       Jorge Sosa          9   7   0.778   0.282   0.259   0.274   0.002432
Rocco Baldelli     Jake Westbrook     13   9   0.692   0.285   0.265   0.283   0.002604
Carlos Lee         Jeff Suppan        17   0   0.000   0.287   0.271   0.291   0.002875
Frank Catalanotto  Mike Timlin         7   6   0.857   0.298   0.257   0.288   0.003029
Frank Catalanotto  Dan Wright          5   5   1.000   0.298   0.285   0.318   0.003231
Hideki Matsui      Aaron Sele         14   0   0.000   0.297   0.303   0.336   0.003269
Mike Lowell        Rheal Cormier       6   5   0.833   0.270   0.230   0.234   0.003355
Omar Vizquel       Javier Vazquez     12   8   0.667   0.274   0.250   0.257   0.003376
Bobby Abreu        Mike Hampton       28   2   0.071   0.296   0.273   0.303   0.003453
Ivan Rodriguez     Jon Garland        16   0   0.000   0.303   0.262   0.298   0.003507
Chone Figgins      Esteban Loaiza     11   8   0.727   0.293   0.265   0.292   0.003530
Shane Halter       Eddie Guardado      5   4   0.800   0.213   0.215   0.169   0.003561
Carl Crawford      Mark Buehrle        7   6   0.857   0.293   0.271   0.297   0.003578
Miguel Cabrera     Steve Trachsel     13   9   0.692   0.300   0.263   0.296   0.003686
Orlando Cabrera    Jae-Weong Seo      16  10   0.625   0.274   0.270   0.277   0.003758
Tony Graffanino    Brian Anderson     21   1   0.048   0.281   0.299   0.315   0.003822
Aubrey Huff        Bronson Arroyo     16  10   0.625   0.290   0.254   0.277   0.003826
Frank Catalanotto  Ryan Franklin       7   6   0.857   0.298   0.272   0.304   0.004070
Edgar Renteria     Sean Burnett        5   5   1.000   0.297   0.301   0.334   0.004139
Brian Buchanan     Jason Schmidt       7   5   0.714   0.244   0.214   0.195   0.004176
Edgar Renteria     Gustavo Chacin      9   7   0.778   0.297   0.268   0.299   0.004218
Hideki Matsui      John Parrish       12   8   0.667   0.297   0.238   0.266   0.004280
Kevin Mench        Ryan Franklin      16  10   0.625   0.276   0.272   0.281   0.004284
D'Angelo Jimenez   Brian Anderson      9   7   0.778   0.268   0.299   0.300   0.004306
Jason Bay          Jeff Francis        5   5   1.000   0.295   0.307   0.338   0.004415
Rafael Palmeiro    Orlando Hernand     8   6   0.750   0.261   0.258   0.252   0.004427
Khalil Greene      Dustin Hermanso     6   5   0.833   0.259   0.256   0.249   0.004512
Lew Ford           Rafael Betancou     8   6   0.750   0.285   0.236   0.253   0.004515
Edgar Renteria     Brian Lawrence      9   7   0.778   0.297   0.272   0.304   0.004637
Jack Wilson        Kazuhisa Ishii      8   6   0.750   0.275   0.246   0.254   0.004648
Craig Monroe       Brad Radke         21  12   0.571   0.271   0.276   0.280   0.004808
Eric Chavez        Roy Halladay        8   6   0.750   0.275   0.248   0.256   0.004840
Michael Tucker     Derek Lowe         10   7   0.700   0.254   0.276   0.264   0.004894
Jose Hernandez     Randy Johnson      12   7   0.583   0.241   0.232   0.208   0.004994
Adrian Beltre      Ismael Valdez       7   6   0.857   0.277   0.305   0.317   0.005174
Jonny Gomes        Bartolo Colon       6   5   0.833   0.268   0.255   0.257   0.005274
Mark Loretta       Kirk Rueter        27   3   0.111   0.314   0.298   0.349   0.005321
Brian Roberts      Mike Mussina       26  14   0.538   0.286   0.264   0.283   0.005446
Miguel Tejada      Justin Miller       5   5   1.000   0.298   0.319   0.354   0.005562
Adrian Beltre      Javier Vazquez      6   5   0.833   0.277   0.250   0.260   0.005580
Brad Hawpe         Duaner Sanchez      6   5   0.833   0.259   0.268   0.260   0.005633
Reed Johnson       Johan Santana      12   7   0.583   0.277   0.205   0.214   0.005819
Doug Glanville     Ramon Ortiz         6   5   0.833   0.240   0.291   0.263   0.005865
Geoff Blum         Jeff Suppan        11   7   0.636   0.237   0.271   0.242   0.006177
Tony Clark         Jeff Weaver         6   5   0.833   0.258   0.276   0.267   0.006338
Jimmy Rollins      Salomon Torres      6   5   0.833   0.281   0.254   0.268   0.006427
Jose Guillen       Pedro Martinez     11   7   0.636   0.295   0.219   0.245   0.006643
Jorge Posada       Curt Schilling     13   8   0.615   0.271   0.252   0.256   0.006658
Travis Hafner      Bartolo Colon      15   0   0.000   0.295   0.255   0.284   0.006699
Kevin Millar       Rick Bauer          6   5   0.833   0.282   0.256   0.271   0.006768
Eric Byrnes        John Halama         6   5   0.833   0.260   0.280   0.274   0.007111
Marlon Byrd        Greg Maddux         8   6   0.750   0.271   0.271   0.275   0.007151
Keith Ginter       Juan Cruz           9   6   0.667   0.244   0.257   0.235   0.007267
Pat Burrell        Horacio Ramirez    16   9   0.563   0.249   0.266   0.249   0.007326
Damion Easley      Kevin Millwood      7   5   0.714   0.229   0.257   0.221   0.007326
Eric Chavez        Horacio Ramirez     6   5   0.833   0.275   0.266   0.275   0.007328
Carlos Delgado     Jorge Julio         6   5   0.833   0.292   0.251   0.276   0.007364
Eddie Perez        Randy Johnson       7   5   0.714   0.254   0.232   0.221   0.007378
Gregg Zaun         Jon Garland        11   7   0.636   0.254   0.262   0.249   0.007396
Aramis Ramirez     Garrett Stephen    10   7   0.700   0.296   0.254   0.283   0.007423
Cody McKay         Dan Miceli          5   4   0.800   0.230   0.240   0.206   0.007520
Ichiro Suzuki      Mark Buehrle       19  12   0.632   0.330   0.271   0.334   0.007638
Aramis Ramirez     Tony Armas          6   5   0.833   0.296   0.249   0.278   0.007644
Alex Rodriguez     Jamie Moyer        23  13   0.565   0.302   0.267   0.302   0.007645
A.J. Pierzynski    Mike Mussina        6   5   0.833   0.281   0.264   0.278   0.007692
Alfonso Soriano    Erik Bedard         6   5   0.833   0.280   0.265   0.278   0.007706
Abraham Nunez      Josh Fogg           6   5   0.833   0.256   0.289   0.278   0.007711
Scott Rolen        Brett Myers        10   7   0.700   0.289   0.262   0.285   0.007741
Eric Chavez        Jeff Weaver        10   7   0.700   0.275   0.276   0.285   0.007749
Luis Gonzalez      Jim Brower          8   6   0.750   0.280   0.266   0.280   0.007762
Corey Koskie       Adam Bernero        6   5   0.833   0.266   0.280   0.279   0.007822
Adam Kennedy       Esteban Loaiza      8   6   0.750   0.282   0.265   0.280   0.007877
Edgar Renteria     Rodrigo Lopez      13   0   0.000   0.297   0.279   0.311   0.007885
Rob Mackowiak      Chris Carpenter    20  10   0.500   0.261   0.237   0.231   0.007902
Carlos Lee         Brian Anderson     33   4   0.121   0.287   0.299   0.320   0.007963
Adrian Beltre      Jae-Weong Seo       6   5   0.833   0.277   0.270   0.280   0.007975
Paul Konerko       John Halama         6   5   0.833   0.267   0.280   0.281   0.008061
Antonio Perez      Jason Schmidt       7   5   0.714   0.280   0.214   0.226   0.008093
Mark Bellhorn      Jose Contreras      5   4   0.800   0.239   0.236   0.210   0.008115
Russell Branyan    Kip Wells           7   5   0.714   0.237   0.255   0.226   0.008180
Rod Barajas        Bartolo Colon      18   0   0.000   0.244   0.255   0.234   0.008328
Jim Edmonds        Jason Jennings     13   0   0.000   0.280   0.293   0.308   0.008382
David Newhan       Jon Lieber          6   5   0.833   0.271   0.280   0.285   0.008564
Craig Counsell     Scott Linebrink     5   4   0.800   0.246   0.232   0.214   0.008624
Carlos Zambrano    Chris Carpenter     7   5   0.714   0.258   0.237   0.229   0.008638
Geoff Jenkins      Tim Redding        14   9   0.643   0.283   0.285   0.302   0.008699
Miguel Olivo       Ted Lilly           5   4   0.800   0.229   0.249   0.214   0.008702
Xavier Nady        Kerry Wood          5   4   0.800   0.262   0.219   0.215   0.008885
Alfonso Soriano    Kevin Brown        15   9   0.600   0.280   0.265   0.278   0.008916
Pat Burrell        Aaron Cook          8   6   0.750   0.249   0.306   0.287   0.008929
Royce Clayton      Rick White          6   5   0.833   0.260   0.294   0.288   0.009009
Fernando Vina      Matt Clement        5   4   0.800   0.243   0.239   0.217   0.009213
J.T. Snow          Kevin Brown         6   5   0.833   0.291   0.265   0.289   0.009247
Kevin Millar       Scot Shields        9   6   0.667   0.282   0.232   0.246   0.009283
Juan Pierre        Roy Oswalt         10   7   0.700   0.303   0.258   0.294   0.009315
Richard Hidalgo    Mike Mussina       11   7   0.636   0.262   0.264   0.259   0.009398
Ramon Martinez     Scott Linebrink     7   5   0.714   0.268   0.232   0.233   0.009438
Miguel Cabrera     Adam Eaton         10   7   0.700   0.300   0.261   0.294   0.009463
Casey Blake        Wade Miller         7   5   0.714   0.257   0.244   0.235   0.009794
Brad Ausmus        Mike Remlinger      5   4   0.800   0.244   0.242   0.221   0.009841
Phil Nevin         Darren Oliver       6   5   0.833   0.270   0.290   0.293   0.009866
John Mabry         Brandon Webb        7   5   0.714   0.258   0.244   0.236   0.009882
Mark Teixeira      Aaron Sele         12   0   0.000   0.282   0.303   0.319   0.009886

Once again we can never say for sure that these are statistically significant (e.g. they represent something not represented by the model) but they are much more likely to be so.

The second question was related to why I thought that certain pitchers did well againt certain pitchers and vice versa. This question sprang from the realization that Brian Anderson made the top 25 list in the article for lowest hit matchups three times, once each with Garrett Anderson, Tony Graffanino, and Carlos Lee. At first glance one might think it had something to do with platoon effects but of course neither Lee nor Graffanino bat left-handed. Any in any case Anderson doesn't have large split differences (.282/.325/.484 vs lefties the last three years and .304/.341/.510 vs righties).

If indeed these matchups are significant it tells me that Anderson likely has something in his delivery that gives certain hitters trouble. For example, his arm angle may be difficult for some hitters to pick up. Or there may be something in his repertoire might be hard for hitters who hit certain pitches well to deal with. I looked at all of Anderson's matchups (116 or so) and didn't really see much of a pattern that I could discern and so I'm still somewhat at a loss to explain it if indeed it isn't simply randomness.

If anyone has better ideas I'm all ears.

Reaching on Error

Awhile back I wrote a post about Willie Wilson and reaching on errors. There I called into question John Miller's recollection that Bill James once wrote that Wilson had reached base on errors 31 times in a season. I doubted the statement since the most I could find in the period 2000-2004 was 16 by Miguel Tejada in 2004.

Well, I've now loaded all 3.7 million records of play by play data for 1970-1992 and ran the following query to see who had reached base the most on errors in individual seasons. The winners with 15 or more ROEs in the period were...

1985    Wally Backman         26
1985    Bob Meacham           26
1987    Wally Backman         22
1986    Willie McGee          21
1977    Bert Campaneris       20
1979    Jack Clark            20
1986    Carney Lansford       20
1984    Al Wiggins            20
1990    Mariano Duncan        20
1975    Dave Cash             19
1974    Lou Brock             18
1973    Pete Rose             18
1975    Thurman Munson        18
1975    Claudell Washington   18
1982    Garry Templeton       18
1985    Dan Gladden           18
1986    Dan Gladden           18
1982    Rafael Ramirez        17
1983    Garry Templeton       17
1975    Ralph Garr            17
1977    Bill Almon            17
1979    Al Cowens             17
1973    Mickey Stanley        17
1971    Cesar Tovar           17
1984    Steve Sax             17
1991    Cal Ripken            17
1970    Mickey Stanley        16
1971    Sandy Alomar          16
1974    Larry Bowa            16
1972    Don Money             16
1978    Larry Bowa            16
1976    Bill Russell          16
1982    Pedro Guerrero        16
1980    Willie Wilson         16
1989    Dan Gladden           16
1985    Mariano Duncan        16
1986    Mariano Duncan        16
1988    Dan Gladden           16
1989    Roberto Alomar        16
1982    Paul Molitor          15
1983    John Castino          15
1983    Tim Wallach           15
1984    Julio Franco          15
1983    Ryne Sandberg         15
1977    Gary Matthews         15
1977    Amos Otis             15
1975    Felix Millan          15
1975    Manny Trillo          15
1973    Tommy Harper          15
1975    Bucky Dent            15
1974    Len Randle            15
1974    Rennie Stennett       15
1970    Aurelio Rodriguez     15
1986    Bob Horner            15
1985    Tom Herr              15
1985    Glenn Hubbard         15
1984    Ryne Sandberg         15
1989    Ricky Jordan          15
1990    Shawon Dunston        15
1990    Joe Carter            15

What I get out of this list is that reaching on errors contains both a component of speed as the list is dominated by speedsters but also an element of luck (Larry Bowa made the list twice after all) mixed with right handed hitters who pulled the ball in the hole (Horner, Carter, Clark, Guerrero). Dan Gladden makes the list four times (85,86,88,89).

You'll also notice that Wilson's best season was 1980 when he reached 16 times on errors.