A Pitcher's Hangover?

While thumbing through the Rockies official magazine sold at the ballpark I found a nice article called The Guide to Coors Field by Owen Perkins. In it, the author talks about the history of Coors Field and of course the issue of playing at altitude from the perspective of the front office, hitters, managers, and pitchers.

In the section on the front office Perkins discusses how GM Dan O'Dowd came to the Rockies with lots of theories about winning at altitude that haven't really paid off. However, he did note that...

"while O'Dowd had done his homework on the physics of baseball at altitude, he found the most significant factor was still an unknown - the effect of the altitude not on the ball, but on the players.

'That's been the biggest learning curve,' O'Dowd confides. 'Physical wear and tear. It's what the game does to you physically, because of the recovery time from altitude, that can't be duplicated anywhere else. You need to build a deeper club that has more interchangeable parts, so you don't have to keep running the same guys out there day in and day out.'

The Rockies have responded by implementing a new training program, specifically designed to prepare players for that physical wear and tear and to help the home team avoid what Greg Maddux calls the 'pitching hangover' that makes its precense known throughout the body a day or two after pitching at altitude."

Both insights - that the Rockies think that physical training is a key to winning here and that Greg Maddux has talked about a pitching "hangover effect" - are news to me. I had always attributed the problem more to the lack of break on curves and sliders in the thin air and low humidity. If there really is a pitching hangover it should manifest itself in starts made by all pitchers after starting Coors Field and in that case then perhaps the effect can be measured. Stay tuned.

To summarize the section O'Dowd noted. "'We have some things internally that we really believe that we're on to that I'm not going to share with anybody..But I don't think there's any one magic formula that's going to change the way the game is played."

The Wisdom of Weaver

As I've mentioned before one of the baseball books I enjoyed last winter is Earl Weaver and Terry Pluto's Weaver on Strategy: The Classic Work on the Art of Managing a Baseball Team. The book was originally published in 1984 and re-released in 2002.

At the end of the book an epilogue published in 2002 recounts "Weaver's 10 Laws" that are sprinkled throughout the book.


Weaver's First Law: No one's going to give a damn in July if you lost a game in March
Excellent point of course. However, for a young team I think there is a bit of confidence that can be gained by playing well in Spring Training. I think what Weaver had in mind is managing to win games in March versus using those games as a tool for player evaluation.


Weaver's Second Law: If you don't make any promises to your players you won't have to break them
Weaver mentions that ideally he wouldn't have to talk to any of his players all season. He also notes that players, for example relief pitchers, who have to be told what their "role" is just don't get it. When asked such a question he would often retort "Your role is to warmup when I tell you and come in the game and pitch when I tell you."


Weaver's Third Law: The easiest way around the bases is with one swing of the bat Can't argue with that logic. In other words power and speed are not equals.


Weaver's Fourth Law: Your most precious possessions on offense are your twenty-seven outs
Weaver was ahead of his time in understanding the importance of not giving away outs. He says it makes no sense to bunt early in the game since you're giving away an out in a situation where a single run is not crucial. The opportunity cost of giving away outs early always exceeds the benefit.


Weaver's Fifth Law: If you play for one run, that's all you'll get
A corollary to the fourth law.


Weaver's Sixth Law: Don't play for one run unless you know that run will win a ballgame
The reason for the fifth law. Dusty Baker should learn this one.


Weaver's Seventh Law: It's easier to find four good starters than five
Once again, impecable logic. I've written before about the long awaited return of the four-man rotation. Craig Wright wrote about this topic at length in The Diamond Appraised in the late 1980s and others have shown that it is not the four-man rotation that increases the risk of injury but rather heavy pitch count games, especially at young ages. Someday, someone will try it and it'll be successful.


Weaver's Eighth Law: The best place for a rookie pitcher is in long relief
Not too much to say about this one. The idea is to not put too much pressure on a rookie and let them develop a bit before relying on them.


Weaver's Ninth Law: The key step for an infielder is the first one - left or right - but before the ball is hit
Weaver talks a bit about defense and cites Al Bumbry as an example of a player who learned how to do this.


Weaver's Tenth Law: The job of arguing with the umpire belongs to the manager, because it won't hurt the team if he gets thrown out of the game
Well, on this score Weaver did his job.

Tony Pena-lized?

Ron makes a case for the removal of Tony Pena. Hard to argue...

Interesting Stat of the Day

This from the Washington Post three days ago: On April 23, 1913 Christy Matheswson needed just 67 pitches in throwing a complete game to beat the Phillies 3-1.

Lewis on Steroids

No, Michael Lewis is not on steroids but he does write a very good piece on the subject in the New York Times Magazine published yesterday titled "Absolutely, Power Corrupts". I was alerted to the article by Baseball Musings.

I found two interesting aspects of the article. First, Lewis recounts the historically weak predictive power in the amateur draft by citing the research of Eddie Epstein.

Epstein took the first two rounds of the drafts from 1987 to 1998 and divided the picks into two groups: the supposedly ''can't miss'' players, taken with the first 20 picks and paid millions of dollars to sign professional contracts; and the ''shouldn't miss'' players, taken in the bottom of the first round and the top of the second round and paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to sign. Of the can't-miss prospects, less than half had meaningful major-league careers -- defined, modestly, by Epstein as having played regularly for three consecutive seasons -- and a quarter never appeared in a major-league game. Of the shouldn't-miss prospects, fully half never had an at-bat in the big leagues -just one in six had made it in the majors. One in six.

This accords pretty much with the research I cited awhile back. This kind of performance in the draft is then what led Billy Beane and the A's to change their draft strategy and instead of evaluating players based only on tools, they chose to use statistics as recounted by Lewis in Moneyball.

What's more interesting, however, is that Lewis then goes on to explain the concept that there are lots of players who are every bit as good as "major leaguers" and that there is no bright line separating the two.

The relatively new ability of big-league front offices to translate minor-league statistics into major-league equivalents has exposed another layer of confusion: a lot of players who make it to the major leagues are essentially interchangeable with those who don't. As Paul DePodesta, general manager of the Los Angeles Dodgers, puts it: "A very small percentage of the players in the big leagues actually are much better than everyone else, and deserve to be paid the millions. A slightly larger percentage of players are actually worse than players who are stuck in the minors, but those guys usually aren't the ones getting the big money. It's the vast middle where the bulk of the inefficiency lies -- the player who is a 'known' player due to his major-league service time making millions of dollars who can be replaced at little to no cost in terms of production with a player making close to the league minimum." Just beneath a thin tier of truly great big-league ballplayers is a roiling inferno of essentially arbitrary promotions and demotions, in which the outcomes are determined by politics, fashion, misunderstanding and luck. Put another way: the market for most baseball players is hugely speculative, more like the market for, say, new Internet stocks than the market for stocks in companies with healthy earnings. The investors don't know how to value the assets.

This is the kind of powerful insight that can lead to saving money for small market teams.

The second interesting aspect of the article was Lewis' profile of Royals third baseman Mark Teahan. Specifically, Lewis focuses on how Teahan is not a pull hitter and that attempts to make him so by both the A's and the Royals (George Brett spent two days with him last July) have failed. Lewis attributes Teahan's ability and preference to go to the opposite field as a result of his childhood wiffle ball games where left field was the short porch and hitting homeruns to right field resulted in outs since the ball ended up in a gutter. Even so, Teahan was the starting third baseman for the Royals this season before going on the DL.

I found this paragraph especially interesting.

Why was Kansas City -- which had had no interest in drafting Mark Teahen just two years earlier -- so keen on him now? The short answer is that their general manager needed a young third baseman, and Teahen was the most likely candidate. The long answer is that Kansas City, haltingly, was buying into the new school of baseball analysis. Baird had, not long ago, hired a statistical analyst. (''I'd tell you who he is,'' he says, ''but he doesn't want me to reveal his identity.'') He still values the opinions of his traditional scouts, of course. But when asked if he would have even thought to pursue Mark Teahen, if he had not had someone analyzing Mark Teahen's minor-league statistics, he says: ''That's tough to answer. I will tell you this -- that the numbers heighten the awareness of a player. And our scouts all said that they didn't think he'd hit for enough power.''

I don't know that I had heard before that Baird used a stats guy - good for him and good for the Royals. The point of Lewis' article, however, is that teams are trying to make everyone into power hitters when they shouldn't and that the pressure to become a power hitter on minor leaguers leads them down the road to steroids. Thankfully it appears that the Royals have allowed Teahan to follow his own path despite Brett's tutoring and Baird thinks Teahan will eventually hit for power and so isn't worried at this point. However, if he doesn't develop power then he had better hit a little more like Wade Boggs (a comparison Tony Pena made in spring training) than Mark McClemore. It is simply a fact of baseball that homeruns are the most efficient way to score runs and so when a player lacks that ability, they need a combination of other abilities (defense, plate discipline) to compensate.

Batting Styles and the Burgess Shale

This is a very interesting article posted to the SABR listserv by Gene Newman. It came from the October 2, 1888 daily paper in Birmingham Alabama.

HOW TO HIT A BALL
Positions of well known players at the bat Pete Browning Has a Fatal Defect But He Gets There- Dave Orr Bats By Contraries-

How Anson Cured Kelly of a Flaw in His Batting.

Is there any fixed rule, any one position for a batter that can be looked upon as absolutely correct? The best way, one would think, could be learned by observing the mode adopted by the best batters. But there are almost as many different positions as there are great batters. In nothing do they more show their individuality.

The instructions which are generally given to a player by the managers and captains are to stand on a line with the center of the plate with the feet a short distance apart, the right one advanced several inches toward the pitcher. It is conceded by most authorities that a better swing can be obtained for the bat in this way.

Very few of the really hard hitters stand in this position, says The New York Sun, except Stovet, of the Athletics. Pete Browning, who headed the list of Association batters two years, and has been among the first for ten seasons, stands on a line with the center of the plate, but his feet are not in the position laid down by rule, or at least he does not keep them that way when he starts to strike at a ball. Instead of stepping forward with the right foot to meet the ball, he steps back with the left. This is considered a fatal defect, and not another successful batter in either league or association does it.

The reason is, it is argued, that by stepping back the player gets away from the ball and cannot hit an out curve, or, if he does, he is apt to knock down the first base foul line. Browning avoids this by striking very quickly, so quick, in fact, that he rarely allows it to get in a line with him. This accounts for the fact that he almost invariably bats to left field, or directly toward third base.

Browning says he can hit the ball harder that way than any other, although his aim is probably not as correct as if he were in a different position. He has a horror of striking out, and when two strikes are called on him he usually draws his feet close together, leans his body forward and hits at the ball very easily, so as to get a good sight on it. Even if he does hit it in that position, he is not likely to knock it out of the diamond. This explains why "The Gladiator" makes but few hits after two strikes have been called.

Tip O'Neill, the St. Louis slugger, copies Browning's position at the plate very nearly. When he strikes at the ball there is a material difference. Instead of stepping back with the right foot, he moves the left back and swings his body around so as to face third base. In this way he gives his bat a terrific momentum, and, as fielders say, sets the ball on fire, it goes so fast when hit.

Big Dave Orr has a position which seems utterly at variance with all the rules of batting. Instead of standing in the center of the plate he takes his place at the extreme edge furthest from the pitcher and almost behind it, in fact. His feet are placed in a most peculiar way. The toes of the right foot point almost toward second base, and the heel is placed in the hollow of the left. He swings his body forward, moving his feet but a few inches, all the swing he gives the bat seeming to come from the upper part of his body. A peculiar thing about his hitting is that he frequently knocks the ball between first and second base, and is by many called a right field hitter.

Denny Lyon, of the Athletics places his feet in the correct position, but he stands well up toward the front of the plate nearest the pitcher and steps back with the right foot when in the act of swinging. Larkin, of the Athletics, stands almost as far back as Orr, but he holds his feet apart and steps up to the ball.

Anson assumes much the same position as Larkin, and also steps forward with the left foot. The scientific manner in which he swings his bat is the chief beauty about his hitting.

Mike Kelly gets on a line with the center of the plate, his body being turned directly toward first base and his head twisted around so that he faces the pitcher. He bends his body slightly forward and steps out with his right foot when striking. Several years ago he seemed to be afraid of a swiftly thrown ball, and he would often step out of the box to avoid an incurve going directly over the plate. This was a fatal defect in his batting. The pitchers knew his weakness, and would "wrap the ball around his neck," to use a baseball phrase. Anson, however hit upon a plan to remedy this.

He made Kelly stand almost completely behind the plate, with his face and chest turned directly toward the pitcher. Then he told him to hold his bat out so that it pointed at second base. When he went to strike he was thus compelled to swing his body back to the bat and then around to the former position again, so that it was almost impossible for him to step out of the way before the ball reached him. This position is by some highly recommended, but it makes the batter exceedingly liable to be hit by the ball. Anson's idea seemed to be that to make Kelly proof against fear he must familiarize him with danger.

Dan Brouthers stands almost at the corner of the box closest to the catcher, and, being lefthanded, his left foot is placed ahead of the right one. He steps back when he strikes at the ball, moving the foot closest to the pitcher. Bobby Caruthers takes the same position. Ryan of the Chicagos, stands at the end of the box nearest the pitcher and holds his feet almost on a line. When he swings his bat he steps forward with the left foot.

Hecker, Collins and Stratton seem to have the best positions. Stratton, in fact, is said by some to have the best position for hitting the ball of any player in the Association. He gets exactly in the center of the batter's box, on the left hand side, and places the toes of the left foot close against the front line of the box, the right foot being back several inches. When he strikes he steps squarely forward and swings his entire body toward the pitchers. The veteran Charley Snyder, when he first saw Stratton bat, said: "That boy may not be a good batter yet, but any player who meets the ball that way is bound to succeed." At bat he is the exact counterpart of Fred Lewis, who at one time was undoubtedly the greatest natural batter that ever lived. Lewis could but seldom be kept sober, however, and now he couldn't play good ball with an amateur club.

Hecker stands back in the box toward the catcher, with his right toes pointed toward first and his left to third base. He moves his feet only a few inches when he strikes, and then directly toward the pitcher. Collins stands in the center of the box, with his left foot forward, and steps up to meet the ball.

There is more art in the manner of swinging the bat, good judges say, than in the position of the feet and body. Most heavy batters, Mike Kelly excepted, grasp the bat close to the end with both hands and swing it around from the shoulders. The sacrifice hitters and the ones who rarely strike out hold one hand close to the bat and the other several inches farther up on the stick. The force thus given is not so great as when held the other way, but a better aim can be taken as the stick is held steadier. They aim to swing the bat on a horizontal line all the way around and not to strike down or up at the ball. It is not necessary to call the full strength into requisition, since the speed at which the pitcher sends the ball causes a slight tap to give it great momentum. Comiskey's instructions to a batter, especially when there is a runner on third, are: "Just meet the ball and it will go far enough. Don't hit as if you were trying to knock it out of the lot."


Overall, the interesting aspect of this article is that it illustrates the general point Stephen Jay Gould made in his essay on the disappearance of the .400 hitter - namely, that as a system stabilizes we should expect to see reduced variation. Gould applied his argument to .400 hitting by postulating that .400 hitters in the early 1900s were not really any better than today's hitters but since the spread of ability at the major league level was flatter (think of a flattened bell shaped curve), those few players were able to take advantage of those on the left side of the curve and pad their averages. Over time the curve has become reduced at the ends and therefore outlier performances are more rare. Gould coupled this argument with the view that through better training techniques and nutrition the entire curve has moved right towards the limit of human athletic ability. This also decreases the amount of room on the right side of the curve in which the best players perform. I've written about Gould's general conclusion before and some refinements of his method.

Gould of course, then used this point in the context of evolution, most famously in his book Wonderful Life using the famous Burgess Shale deposits where he argues that in the early days of evolution (before the Cambrian period) a greater number of body plans were extant because life as a system had not stabilized into the few body plans we know today.

As I read this article I thought about how hitting styles have changed just in the last 20 years. It's obvious from watching ESPN Classic that a majority of hitters in the 1970s and 80s hit with a closed stance - some, like George Hendrick and Jack Clark extremely closed. It is not unlikely today to watch a game and not see a single batter with a closed stance. Modern hitters tend to favor the open stance (Brian Downing was one of the first I remember adopting this style) as a means of focusing both eyes on the pitcher and increasing depth perception as the ball approaches. And some hitters, like Sammy Sosa, who began his career in a closed stance have opened up a bit over time. It'll be interesting to see how hitting styles evolve in the future.

Experiment Over

Well, Pick has been sent back to Nebraska and the sabermetric experiment is over. While the sample size is really too small to say anything definitely (just 27 at bats), I’m told by sources in Kansas City that Calvin Pickering looked truly awful in those plate appearances while striking out 14 times. Although he certainly didn’t produce a Pickering apologist like myself is obligated to point out that he was not put in the lineup on a regular basis against right handers and was distracted by his wife giving birth in the last week or so. Interestingly, the Royals did not call up Ken Harvey but opted instead for Mike Diaz who was hitting .364 for Omaha with four homeruns. Well, at least the Royals still have Emil Brown...

That said, Pick's prodigious strikeout rate called to mind those who walk back to the bench bat in hand most frequently. For over 1,000 at bats coming into this season the non-pitcher leaders are:

Russ Branyan   41.0%
Dave Nicholson 40.4%
Melvin Nieves  39.3%
Rob Deer       36.3%
Bo Jackson     35.1%
Mark Bellhorn  33.5%
Adam Dunn      32.7%
Ruben Rivera   32.1%
Sam Horn       31.0%
Craig Wilson   30.6%

Of course, this list takes into account at bats only and not walks. If walks were considered Branyan , Bellhorn, and Dunn would all fair better since they have more plate discipline.

Altitude Bias?

Since 1993 the Rockies have won 882 games and lost 999 putting them near the bottom (and not counting Arizona and Tampa Bay ahead of only Florida at 882 (who also has two World Championships), Kansas City at 841, Pittsburg at 835, Milwaukee at 825, and Detroit at 779 (Atlanta leads the pack at 1,149 wins followed by the Yankees and Giants). This level of mediocrity calls out for an explanation.

I first explored this topic and the common explanation offered by some Rockies players that there is a "hangover effect" as Rockies hitters adjust to hitting at sea level. Like others before me I didn’t find any evidence for such an effect.

After thinking about it a bit more I wondered if the effects of a team at this altitude were simply more systemic and rooted in how that team evaluates its players. In other words, could it be the case that the Rockies overvalue players because they look like above average performers based on the strength of their home splits? The cases of Vinny Castilla and Dante Bichette are at least anecdotal evidence that this may be the case (of course right now Vinny looks like a good pickup by the Nationals GM Jim Bowden but given his track record away from Denver I wouldn't expect it to last). This "altitude bias" may be enhanced by the fact that the Rockies AAA club plays right here in Colorado Springs at a slightly higher altitude.

For example, this springs the Rockies appeared to really be evaluating centerfielder Choo Freeman as a possible fourth outfielder. Last season Freeman hit .297/.350/.478 with the Sky Sox, which on another AAA team might translate into replacement-level offensive at the major league level. However, playing at 6,000 feet Freeman’s AAA translated or equivalent stats were .239/.290/.374 with a Value Over Replacement Player (VORP) of -6.5 and Marginal Value Lineup Rate (MLVR) of -.009. In other words, Freeman was below average in his league based on MLVR and therefore well below average at the major league level. Would other teams have even considered Freeman as a possible candidate given that his defense is below average and his history of stolen bases is abysmal (25 SB 24 CS at all levels since 2002)?

To test this theory I decided to make some blanket comparisons between offensive performance of players when in a Rockies uniform and those same players when playing with other teams. If the Rockies tend to overvalue mediocre offensive players, their performance on other teams should be worse than average performance when players leave other teams.

Here’s what I found (all numbers are only since 1993, BRA = OBP * SLUG and is a slightly better predictor of offensive production than OPS).

              AVG OBP  SLUG  OPS  BRA
With COL     .281 .340 .451 .791 .153
Not with COL .256 .321 .394 .715 .126

I then compared these numbers to other teams:

         AVG  OBP  SLUG OPS  BRA
FLO     .260 .327 .403 .729 .132
Not FLO .269 .332 .416 .749 .139

LAN     .260 .325 .399 .723 .129
Not LAN .265 .335 .413 .748 .139

CHN     .260 .322 .397 .719 .128
Not CHN .264 .326 .401 .727 .131

SLN     .266 .333 .419 .752 .139
Not SLN .261 .325 .410 .734 .133

MIN     .263 .327 .392 .719 .128
Not MIN .252 .317 .378 .695 .120

With the exception of the Twins, all the other team’s players performed better when leaving their teams than Rockies players did when leaving Denver. So does this result mean anything? I’d be hesitant to put too much weight on it but generally speaking it seems to hold. Rockies players don’t do quite as well when leaving Denver as other players do.

Nomar No More

Although we shouldn't be suprised, Cubs fans were more than a bit disappointed last night when Nomar Garciapara tore a groin muscle while struggling to get out of the batters box after hitting a ground ball. He'll be out two to three months.

This, coupled with the injury to Todd Walker, only serves to highlight the weakness of the Cubs bench. In today's game with the Cardinals Jerry Hairston, Neifi Perez, and Henry Blanco are all on the field. Add the pitcher's spot and four of your nine lineup positions are almost totally non-productive.

Coming into the season the only two positions the Cubs were likely to get increased production from were second base and shortstop assuming full seasons from Garciapara and Walker. Now, they'll be lucky to come close to last seaon's productivity in those two slots. Because the Cubs have no depth in the outfield either, there is almost no way Jim Hendry will be able to swing a trade to bring in a decent offensive middle infielder.

The only good news to come out of Chicago this week was the second start for Mark Prior. He's now 2-0 with a 0.00 ERA, 13 IP, 8, 3 BB, 12 SO. Ryan Dempster is also pitching well again today, going into the 5th having given up a single run. Of course, the Cardinals are not hitting well right now but it is encouraging.

Dropped Third

I should have mentioned in my description of the play in last night's Rockies game that there were 2 outs at the time. If there had been only one out and a dropped third strike occurred the batter would have been out immediately. This is to prevent the defense from intentionally dropping third strikes and recording force outs or double and triple plays at other bases.

Rockies ExSpeiered

They say that you always see something at a baseball game you've never seen before. Actually, I have seen this play before but I don't remember seeing it at a major league game.

In the top of the 6th inning the Diamond Backs first baseman Chad Tracy was batting against Rockies starter Shawn Chacon. With the count 0-2 and a runner on first Chacon threw a hard breaking curve on the inside corner. Tracy started his swing and the ball hit him on the foot and bounded towards the Arizona dugout. Immediately, the Rockies catcher J.D. Closser asked home plate umpire Chris Guccione to appeal the swing to the third base umpire Andy Fletcher. Meanwhile the runner on first was heading to second thinking it was a dropped third strike while Tracy stood quietly in the batter's box as the ball had come to a stop by the dugout. Fletcher obliged Closser and the home plate umpire signaled Tracy out. Folks in the press box were a bit confused at this point since it appeared that it was a dropped third strike and therefore a live ball. However, after calling down to the field the fact that the ball had hit Tracy's foot became apparent and in that situation if the batter swings at the ball and it hits him it immediately becomes a dead ball and simply a strikeout.

Now, on to something more familiar. Chacon left the game after 6 strong innings leading 3-1. His only mistake was turned into a 438 foot homerun by Troy Glaus earlier in the 6th. I hadn't watched Chacon pitch much but he changed speeds very effectively and used both sides of the plate very well. Ryan Speier relieved Chacon in the 7th and proceeded to give up five straight hits and four runs before being lifted and that was the ballgame. Another blown save for the Rockies who fall to 2-10. If a deep bullpen is a necessary ingredient to winning at altitude, this could be a long summer indeed.

Day 2

Tonight was my second game at Coors Field as an MLB.com stringer but the first in which I was actually scoring. I arrived in plenty of time and was pleased to find that all the windows in the press box were wide open on a sunny and very pleasant day with temps in the high 60s. After unpacking the laptop and connecting I was able to spend 30 minutes or so just watching batting practice and enjoying the atmosphere of this beautiful ballpark before the game with the Giants.

A little after 5pm I checked the rosters for both teams and found that the Giants Lance Niekro was now wearing number 28 instead of number 36. In talking with the Giants PR staff I found out that Niekro had his number switched since former Giant Gaylord Perry had worn that number and it is to be retired this season.

In other news, since the last time I was here rookie Clint Barmes has continued hitting the cover off the ball with a .389 average before tonight’s game and now has four homeruns (all at Coors Field). In tonight’s game he was 2-2 with a sacrifice, was hit by pitches twice, and stole 2 bases and was thrown out once (actually picked off when he wandered too far off second). He’s definitely a fun player to watch. Unfortunately, the Rockies had lost eight straight, the third longest in their history (they lost 13 in a row in 1993). Pitching has been the biggest culprit and control the biggest pitfall. Before tonight’s game the pitching staff had walked 54 in 75 innings while striking out 44 and had an 8.28 ERA. Ouch.

In tonight’s game luckily Joe Kennedy pitched well over 6 and 2/3 innings and left with the Rockies up 5-2 courtesy of four runs scored on Jason Schmidt in the third inning. Schmidt struggled with his control all evening throwing just 57 strikes in 107 pitches. In the 9th the Giants scored two runs off of Chin-hui Tsao on a Michael Tucker homerun to make it 5-4. After an Omar Vizquel double, however, Ray Durham flew out to Preston Wilson to end the game and Rockies eight game losing streak and bring their record to 2-8.

Although there were a fair number of pinch hitters and pitching changes, and even my first double-switch, the game was pretty easy to score since there were no errors or difficult scoring plays. Looking forward to being back on Monday night when the Rockies take on the Diamond Backs.

Moneyball and the Angels

Read this interesting article on MLB.com titled "Westworld: 'Moneyball' vs. Mikeyball". In the article, the author Doug Miller, contrasts the approach of the Angels and Mike Scioscia and the A's and Billy Beane. In talking about the Angels Miller notes:

"They're also not going to apologize for their brand of offense, which is built around aggressive baserunning, calculated situational hitting and constant pressure on defenses."

To highlight this he notes that the Angels were 28th in the majors and last in the AL in walks in 2004 with 450. As for the A's he says:

"The Oakland A's, of course, have been molded into an on-base-percentage machine. General manager Billy Beane's strategy is to draw walk after walk, tire out pitchers, then slug away and drive in runs."

And together:

"Both organizations believe strongly in their philosophies and both have good points. One preaches patience, the other pressure."

The A's as expected were fifth in walks with 608. Call me a skeptic but I tend to think that 158 more baserunners is a better bet to produce runs than "aggressive baserunning" and "calculated situational hitting". Of course, in the final analysis the Angels scored 836 runs while the A's scored 793 even though the A's hit 189 homeruns and Angels just 162. How did they do it?

Interestingly, the Angels seemed to squeeze more runs from their offensive elements as compared to various run estimators.

          R   OPS   RC   BR  BsR
A's     793  .778  837  840  835
Angels  836  .772  830  807  797

As you can see, had they both scored the amount predicted by their offensive elements the A's would have outscored the Angels, although not by much despite the A's advantages in walks and homeruns. This is the case since their OPS was almost equivalent due to the fact that Oakland hit .270 as a team while the Angels hit .282 which resulted in almost identical on base and slugging percentages.

What is interesting is that the Angels scored 20 or so more runs than would be expected while the A's scored about 40 fewer runs. Could this be accounted for by baserunning? In the article the author quotes Scioscia:

"'We all agree with on-base percentage, but 'Moneyball' doesn't tell the whole story, I put much more stock in getting into scoring position than on-base percentage. If you have team speed, you have to use it.'

By Scioscia's numbers, the Angels ranked second in the Majors last year with 99 successful advances from first base to third on base hits. The Angels were thrown out six times trying that move. Scioscia says the A's only tried it 36 times and were thrown out twice."

Well, according to my baserunning framwork the Angels had 375 opportunities to advance on a single when a runner was on first. In those chances the runner on first advanced to third 107 times, scored 4 times, and was thrown out 10 times. The A's on the other hand 340 chances, advancing to third 81 times, scoring twice and getting thrown out four times. So even with their aggressive style the Angels netted only 20 more bases in these situations. And if you consider that the six extra runners taken off the bases are relatively much more expensive, it would seem that the teams are fairly close. I'm not sure why the numbers in the article are different than what I found but I also ran the numbers when second base was not occupied and got the following:

      Opp To3 Score  Out
ANA   271  74   3     7
OAK   235  58   2     1

In this scenario the difference shrinks to 10 extra bases for the Angels.

When looked at as a whole the Angels and A's baseunning were pretty similar with the Angels gaining about 6 bases less than would be expected while the A's gained about 13 less. Neither of these results helps to explain the +20 run difference for the Angels and the -40 run difference for the A's.

So what could it be?

It's that "calculated situational hitting"! This is borne out by the difference in the teams hitting with runners in scoring position. The Angels hit .278/.343/.440 and scored 659 runs (3rd in the league) when batting with runners in scoring position while the A's hit just .260/.352/.410 and scored just 573 runs (17th in the league). And with runners on the Angels hit .291/.351/.456 while the A's managed .268/.350/.430. You probably could have guessed this by noting that the Angels had 35 more singles with a runner on first than the A's did despite the fact that they netted 73 more baserunners (H+BB-HR) on the season than the Angels did.

The real question is whether the Angels hot hitting is simply luck or a real skill. Sabermetric analysis has typically poo pooed such notions as pointed out in my post on Bill James' article in the Baseball Research Journal. I ran a few regressions on hitting with runners on in 2003 and 2004 at the team level and found the following correlation coefficients:

BA:  .320
OBP: .352
SLG: .366
OPS: .328

Not a strong correlation but not totally random either. It'll be interesting to see how the Angels do with their strategy this year.

Uh Oh

All of us "stat geeks" are shaking in our shoes after the start that Calvin Pickering has had (or actually hasn't). So far just 3 hits in 19 at bats, 1 homerun, to go with 8 strikeouts and just 1 walk. He's also displayed some horrendous baserunning. Rob and Rany discuss the situation here.

I'm sure Calvin's on a short leash and so I wouldn't expect him to make it in June if things don't turn around. I wonder how Ken Harvey is hitting in Omaha...actually he's 7 for 28 with no homeruns and 2 doubles.

Foul Outs

While watching the Yankees-Red Sox game tonight on ESPN I was interested in the Rick Sutcliffe's comment that a foul ball that landed in the seats behind third base would have been caught in other parks such as Oakland Coliseum. I've looked at some quantification of foul outs before in relation to homeruns but thought I'd run the numbers myself using play-by-play data for 2003 and 2004.

Without further ado, here are the numbers of foul outs in decreasing order in those two seasons where FO3 means foul outs behind first base etc....

     FO3  FO5  FO2  FO9  FO7 Total
OAK  126  118   55   18   28  345
TBA  120  111   47   24   35  337
FLO  135   80   73   24   22  334
CHA  123   92   74   20   17  326
LAN   98  118   61   17   16  310
TEX  120   90   78    8   11  307
MIN   99   88   58   32   29  306
MIL  125   82   70    9   12  298
ANA   81   92   71   21   25  290
SEA   95   92   69   16   18  290
ARI  107   85   48   18   18  276
DET   83   95   53   17   23  271
BAL  103   73   52   14   26  268
CIN   88   89   64   10   17  268
TOR  115   74   43   13   22  267
PHI  116   80   45   13   11  265
KCA   97   84   58   13   11  263
SDN   87   84   36   23   21  251
SFN   84   65   66   13   17  245
COL   94   64   43   22   20  243
SLN   97   70   54   14    6  241
NYN   90   60   64   16   11  241
CLE   79   72   63    9   17  240
MON   79   69   55   20   15  238
ATL   84   75   30   33   15  237
BOS   81   70   74    3    5  233
CHN   73   60   66   10    9  218
HOU  106   58   38    9    4  215
PIT   79   53   44   18   11  205
NYA   62   55   77    3    6  203

So the difference between parks with the most foul outs and fewest is on the order of 70 per season. From this list it appears Oakland, Tampa Bay, and Florida have the most foul territory around the infield while Tampa Bay, Minnesota, and Atlanta have the most foul territory in the outfield. It's not surprising that the smallest outfield foul territory looks like Boston, Yankee Stadium, and Houston.

The Hangover Effect

Because I'll be scoring games at Coors Field this season I've been interested in studies that have done on the "Coors Field Effect" and theories on how to win at altitude. Perhaps the first, and most prevalent, of the theories is that Rockies players suffer from a "hangover" effect when they go on the road, accounting for their poor road performance. For example, an article on Slate published last April summed it up this way:

"Rockies hitters-usually struggling hitters-claim that the team is penalized by a hangover effect, where playing at high altitude leaves them ill-prepared to go on the road again and face snapping breaking pitches."

The article goes on to reference the 2000 Baseball Prospectus article by Rany Jazayerli and Keith Woolner that concluded there was no hangover based on data from 2000. I was in the midst of running the numbers myself for 2003 and 2004 when I ran into these articles and so I'll simply publish my results as support for the conclusion that a hangover effect probably does not exist.

2004     G      AB    H   TB   BB    AVG   SLUG    OBP    OPS
Road
1st game 18    450  126  228   46  0.280  0.507  0.347  0.853
others   63   2335  559  894  211  0.239  0.383  0.302  0.685
total    81   2785  685 1122  257  0.246  0.403  0.310  0.713       
Home
1st game 13    456  141  242   64  0.309  0.531  0.394  0.925
others   68   2336  705 1172  242  0.302  0.502  0.367  0.869
total    81   2792  846 1414  306  0.303  0.506  0.372  0.878
        162   5577 1531 2536  563  0.275  0.455  0.341  0.796
         
2003
Road         
1st game 15    511  125  188   56  0.245  0.368  0.319  0.687
others   66   2258  538  887  234  0.238  0.393  0.310  0.703
total    81   2769  663 1075  290  0.239  0.388  0.312  0.700

Home
1st game 14    498  149  266   53  0.299  0.534  0.367  0.901
others   67   2251  660 1117  276  0.293  0.496  0.370  0.867
total    81   2749  809 1383  329  0.294  0.503  0.370  0.873
        162   5518 1472 2458  619  0.267  0.445  0.341  0.786

As you can see, in both 2003 and 2004 the Rockies actually hit better for average in the first game of a road trip than they did in subsequent games although in 2003 their OPS was slightly lower. They also hit better in the first game of homestands for whatever its worth. In any case, there taking these two seasons there doesn't seem to be any reason to believe in the hangover effect as it pertains to first games of series. Of course, that doesn't mean that the hangover might not be persistent for the entire road trip. However, that would be pretty much indistinguishable from the thesis that the Rockies hitters are simply below average, a fact that Coors Field masks.

Scuffling

Well, the Cubs have scuffled out to a 3-4 start. The four losses have revealed their four key weaknesses.

a) Lack of depth in the starting rotation. Without Mark Prior and a healthy Kerry Wood and with the loss of Matt Clement and an aging Greg Maddux, Ryan Dempster has gotten two starts in the first seven games. He was bombed in his first start giving up seven runs in three and two-thirds. In his second start today he pitched well, but if past performance is any indication, I doubt he'll wind up with an ERA below 5.00. I wouldn't be surprised if Glendon Rusch eventually takes the fifth starter spot. Championship teams simply don't run pitchers the quality of Dempster out there.

b) Lack of depth in the bullpen. Poor performances by John Leicester, Latroy Hawkins (who blew his only save opportunity), and Todd Wellmeyer have contributed to several losses. The bullpen is likely to be further weakened if Rusch moves into the rotation. Championship teams have deep bullpens.

c) Lack of depth on the bench. This one is the most vexing because its the easiest to solve. Take a look at the Cubs pinch hitting stats for 2005:

Jerry Hairston     0-2, 1 LOB
Jose Macias        1-5, 3 LOB
Neifi Perez        0-3, 1 RBI, 4 LOB
Todd Hollandsworth 0-1 1 LOB
Jason Dubois       0-1, 1 K

So that's 1-12. But despite that Jose Macias has been called on to pinch hit 5 times in 7 games. There is definitely something wrong with this picture. Why on earth isn't Dubois pinch hitting against left handed pitchers at least and Hollandsworth against right handers? Or for that matter why isn't Hairston pinch hitting? Or better yet, why do we have three utility infielders on the bench? And now of course, the bench only gets weaker as Todd Walker goes on the DL and Baker switches between Hairston, Perez, and Macias at second base. Championship teams have guys who can come off the bench and deliver key hits.

e) Poor decision making by the manager. In today's 1-0 loss to the Padres, Corey Patterson singled to lead off the 8th inning. Rather than try and steal Dusty Baker elected to sacrifice with Perez (who, incidentally was batting second for some unknown reason while Derrek Lee was relegated to the 6th spot with his 7 walks in 7 games). A higher percentage approach would have been to allow Patterson to try and steal and then bunt him over to third. Of course, Nomar Garciapara was then walked, Aramis Ramirez popped up, and Jeremy Burnitz made the third out. In the 7th inning Derrek Lee led off with a single. After strikeouts by Hollandsworth and Barrett Baker pinch hits for Michael Wuertz with Jose Macias. Now, assuming Macias even got a hit, the odds of Lee scoring are not good. Why not try and run Lee or if not pinch hit with someone who may actually have a chance of driving the ball and scoring the run like Dubois? I don't know either. Championship teams play smart baseball.

Pitching Woes

The first week of the season was not kind to the Rockies. After winning the season opener in thrilling fashion they proceeded to lose four straight. Pitching has been the culprit.

             IP  H   R  ER HR BB SO    ERA  
Starters   24.7 35  28  25  5 16 16   9.12
Relievers  17.3 24  21  21  4 15  9  10.91 and 3 blown saves

Scott Dohman and Allan Simpson have had the worst of it with Dohman giving up four homeruns in an inning and a third for a 32.40 ERA and Simpson giving up five runs in two-thirds of an inning for an ERA of 67.50.

Patience, Patience

Interesting post here relating the comments of Pirates manager Lloyd McClendon on plate discipline.

To that end here are the rankings in 2004 listing the most patient to the least patient teams in terms of pitches per plate appearance. For Cubs fans it's not surprising that they're towards the bottom. Boston and Oakland towards the top are also not surprising.

Team    Pitches   PA    PIT/PA
BOS     25598   6515    3.93
OAK     25135   6459    3.89
MIL     23892   6195    3.86
CIN     24097   6278    3.84
PHI     24724   6456    3.83
TOR     23629   6178    3.82
CLE     24578   6452    3.81
KCA     23434   6153    3.81
MON     23347   6138    3.80
NYN     23612   6209    3.80
LAN     23745   6244    3.80
BAL     24414   6431    3.80
NYA     24125   6364    3.79
COL     23936   6333    3.78
SEA     24008   6362    3.77
SLN     23751   6297    3.77
TEX     23568   6256    3.77
CHA     23260   6197    3.75
FLO     23026   6160    3.74
DET     23486   6285    3.74
ATL     23633   6339    3.73
MIN     23361   6286    3.72
SDN     23444   6313    3.71
HOU     23115   6269    3.69
PIT     22498   6115    3.68
ARI     22487   6114    3.68
ANA     23000   6296    3.65
CHN     22813   6281    3.63
TBA     22144   6098    3.63
SFN     23259   6466    3.60

Stringer at Altitude

Last season I had the privilege of working as a stringer (technically a "Datacaster") for MLB.com on their Gameday system. Essentially, this means I got paid for attending 27 Kansas City Royals games at beautiful Kauffman Stadium. I shared the job with two other veteran stringers.

Of course, there was some work thrown in as well as I had to learn the software used to score the game as well as the combination of codes used to record pitches, balls put in play, and base running. The codes are actually those that were originally developed as a part of Project Scoresheet in the mid 1980s and promoted by Bill James and John Dewan who now owns Baseball Info Solutions. To illustrate the kinds of codes consider the following; if the batter singles to center on a ground ball and is thrown out by the centerifielder trying to stretch the single into a double the code would be:

S8/G.BX2(84)

Where
S8 = single to center
G = on the ground
BX2 = batter out advancing to second
(84) = thrown out by the centerfielder with a putout for the second baseman

The software we use is a Visual Basic 6.0 application that has evolved over the years to incorporate additional functionality and communicates to servers located in New York that then feed the data to the Gameday clients implemented as a Macromedia Flash application.

And both before and after the game there are responsibilities including ensuring that the rosters are correct, printing and distributing the box scores to the other media, and double checking the official scorer’s box score and faxing the official statistics to the Elias Sports Bureau. But all in all, it’s not a bad gig to say the least.

When we decided to move to Colorado Springs this winter I was happy to discover that MLB.com needed a new stringer in Denver to help handle Rockies games along with the veteran father and son team Mike and Eric. Well, tonight was my first game in that role and the first that I’ve ever attended at Coors Field with the Rockies taking on the San Diego Padres. Actually, I didn’t have to score the game since Eric was in the hot seat and showed me the ropes in my new digs while I kept a paper scoresheet.

The game was scheduled to start at 6:35 and so I left my office in Colorado Springs at 4:00 in order to make sure I arrived in plenty of time. MapQuest said my office was 59 miles from Coors Field and I made good time…at first. About 10 miles from the park I ran into a major slowdown and proceeded to cover the next three miles in 30 minutes. Needless to say I was a bit late but finally found the main parking lot out behind right field. Using my press pass I entered through the right field entrance and after two elevator rides, several questions asked of ushers, and walking half way around the ballpark and its very wide concourses I found the press box at 5:55. Eric was of course already at work and had finished checking the roster and inputing the lineups. He showed me around the press box and introduced me to the Rockies PR staff and the official scorer, all of whom were very pleasant. The press box is much larger than in Kansas City but includes the same free drinks and popcorn along with some tasty cookies.

It wasn’t long before the game was underway. Unlike in Kansas City the MLB.com guys sit right down in the middle front although this doesn’t provide a view of the monitor which can help when enter pitch location into the software. Right away I was greeted to baseball at altitude as Sean Burroughs doubled over the head of Matt Holliday in left, Mark Loretta walked and Brian Giles hit a 418 foot homerun into the bullpen in right. It wasn’t long before Rockies starter Jason Jennings had given up six runs (four earned) in three innings of work. Adam Eaton for the Padres looked pretty sharp although the Rockies got to him for a single run in the first courtesy of the 327th double of Todd Helton’s career, two unearned runs in the fourth and the second homerun in as many games for shortstop Clint Barmes. An RBI double by Matt Holliday in the same inning finally chased Eaton to make the score 7-5 Padres in the fifth. On Monday Barmes became the first rookie in major league history to hit a walk-off homerun on opening day in the Rockies 12-10 win.

Jennings lasted four innings before giving way to newly acquired Byung-Hyun Kim, who looked pretty good in his two innings of work. The wheels really fell off the wagon however when Allan Simpson entered the game in the 7th. He proceeded to walk the bases loaded, give up a single, and then a two-run double to pinch hitter Eric Young to give the Padres a 10-5 lead before making his exit amid a chorus of jeers. Javier Lopez then let in the two remaining runners credited to Simpson and two of his own to make it 14-5 before getting himself pulled from the game. The Rockies were able to plate one more in the ninth courtesy of Helton again to make the final 14-6. Just another night at altitude?

Incidentally, this game illustrates why the "win" statistics for pitchers, especially relievers, is a poor proxy for performance. The Padres starter Eaton pitched just 4 and 2/3 innings and so did not qualify for the win. He was relieved by Tim Redding who pitched a third of an inning. Rudy Seanez then entered the game and pitched an inning before giving way to Chris Hammond and his 64mph changeup that he used quite effectively. The question is, who should get the win? Redding pitched just a third of an inning, Seanez only one and when Hammond came in the game was already 14-5 and he pitched just 2 innings. None of them really deserved it but Hammond was credited with it on the discretion of the official score because…somebody has to get it.

I think it’ll be an interesting year to watch the Rockies since they’ve very purposefully changed their direction. The PR campaign they’re using is "GenR" to highlight the youth of the team. In fact, on opening day the Rockies were the youngest team in all of baseball with an average age of 26 years 324 days. Tampa Bay, Minnesota, Arizona, and Kansas City round out the top five with the Royals at 28 years 178 days. Even though I doubt they’ll be close to contending it should be fun to watch these young players and see if they can develop. In the past the Rockies have made some truly bad signings, relying on expensive free agent pitchers including Denny Neagle, Mike Hampton, Bill Swift, and Bret Saberhagen, none of whom have delivered, and which has subsequently put the franchise in a hole financially. During the off-season General Manager Dan O’Dowd publicly admitted that he had made some ego-driven moves in the past and felt very comfortable with the youth movement this season. Regardless of what happens it couldn’t be any worse than watching last year’s 104 loss edition of the Royals could it?

I’ll also of course be interested to watch baseball at Coors Field and compare it to playing at sea level. While I haven’t done much investigation into the "Coors Field effect" it seems to me that if indeed Rockies hitters have difficulty adjusting after playing at altitude as some have speculated and Todd Helton has mentioned, the team is clearly at a disadvantage. And of course, it seems obvious that a team that plays in a high run environment should put a premium on relief pitching since they’ll have to use relievers more frequently. Unlike other teams the Rockies probably have a valid argument to carry 12 pitchers. Maybe a new kind of baseball might help as well.

In any case it was a fun evening and I’m looking forward to lots of hits, runs, and errors this summer.

More Second Guessing

Here's the same point I made about Dusty but with more stats...I hestitate to even call this second guessing. It's more like first guessing and it wouldn't have mattered one little bit whether or not Perez had gotten a hit. Still the wrong move. Be the house.

Dusty, Jose, and Neifi

After a good start on opening day where the Cubs scored 16 runs on 23 hits they managed just 4 runs tonight in losing 5-4. What is frustrating is that having gotten to within 5-4 in the top of the 8th, the Derrek Lee singles in the top of the 9th and steals second with two outs. With the pitcher due up against right-handed reliever Brandon Lyon, Dusty Baker looks down his bench and who does he call on? You got it. Neifi Perez. Ground out, game over. To add injury to insult in the 7th Dusty pinch hit Jose Macias. Hmmm.

Well, the Cubs bench is certainly weak. Dusty could have selected:

Henry Blanco
Jason Dubois
Jerry Hairston

Now, none of these guys are top notch hitters (although the jury is still out on Dubois) and you can't really call Blanco a hitter but clearly both Dubois and Hairston are better options than either Macias or Perez. So why does Dusty insist on shooting himself in the foot by pinch hitting these guys? One theory of course is that Dusty dislikes young players and so we probably won't see much of Dubois before he's sent down in favor of some overpriced veteran. Another is that he has favorites and God help us Macias and Perez have become so for Dusty.

Note to Jim Hendry: Don't give Dusty a bench populated with weak hitting infielders. He'll use them as pinch hitters.

My fear is that a weak bench that costs games will become a theme for the 2005 Cubs.

Baseball Analytics

Here's a nice piece on sabermetrics published in May of 2004 and how it can apply to business via the quantification of employee contributions through a profile of the Red Sox. One of the most interesting is this description of E Scout, the scouting software used by the Red Sox.

"One of the first moves Epstein made when he joined the Sox was to bring in a software package called ScoutAdvisor from E Solutions, a little-known Tampa, Fla., company. Epstein had used the software, which keeps track of player talent from the minors to the pros, while with the San Diego Padres, where he was director of player development. E Solutions now counts nine Major League Baseball teams on its client list. IBM has a similar package called PROS, in use by a similar number of teams. Both are based on the Lotus Domino platform.

Michael Morizio, co-owner of E Solutions, says the software was originally developed five years ago as a custom project for the New York Yankees. The team had begun building its own software to store and analyze scouting reports, but the project bogged down. It was simply too much of an undertaking for the team's small technology staff.

Through Yankee owner George Steinbrenner's Tampa contacts (his primary residence is in the area), E Solutions was called in to finish the job. After completing the software, the company saw the potential to build and expand the offering. Rather than just focus on scouting, Morizio saw the potential to build a complete player management system that could track player development as well as provide a team's front office with a window into the rest of the league.

E Solutions has since gone full circle with the Yankees, announcing plans in March to replace the team's custom system with ScoutAdvisor. The software is licensed for about $50,000 to $75,000 per year depending on the options.

The heart of the system is housed in a 15,000-square-foot data center in downtown Tampa. There, computers store raw data on baseball players, such as high school and college records, family backgrounds, psychological profiles and medical histories, culled from a wide range of sources.

E Solutions pulls in the feeds daily from a range of data sources, including the Major League Baseball Scouting Bureau, SportsTicker Enterprises and STATS Inc. The Major League Scouting Bureau has administered an Athletic Success Profile test to prospects every year since 1974, asking 110 questions designed to uncover their psychological profile. The questions measure 11 attributes including drive, endurance, leadership, self-confidence, emotional control, mental toughness, coachability and trust....

The ScoutAdvisor software package also is designed to help teams gather original data on players. ScoutAdvisor features a variety of modules tailored for amateur scouting, pro scouting, international scouting, medical injury tracking and major league player transaction reporting, among others.

The amateur scouting module allows scouts to file such stats as hitting power or fielding ability and commentary such as "exhibits a lot of hustle," from the field using laptops or personal digital assistants and an Internet connection."

Very cool stuff. I remember years ago the Seattle Mariners had a scouting tool based on Pocket PCs that Microsoft had developed for them. At one time the consulting company I was with in Kansas City made a small attempt to pitch something like it to the Royals to no avail.

Balls in Play Distribution

Last weekend I discussed how luck plays a larger role in batting average than it does in either slugging percentage or on base percentage. As an extension of that discussion I took a look at the distribution of batted balls for hitters in 2004 for those who put more than 100 balls in play. A quick summary follows.

Here are the leaders in hitting fly balls. The average percentage is 28.5%.

                 F       L       G      P    Total
Mike Cameron   142 41%  56 16% 106 30% 44 13% 348
Corey Koskie   131 41%  51 16% 113 35% 28  9% 323
Frank Thomas    73 40%  41 22%  54 29% 16  9% 184
Jason Giambi    81 40%  18  9%  83 40% 23 11% 205
David Ortiz    180 39%  91 20% 155 34% 31  7% 457
Jeff Kent      176 39%  83 18% 165 36% 31  7% 455
A. Soriano     187 38% 104 21% 164 33% 37  8% 492
Jim Edmonds    134 38%  83 24% 117 33% 19  5% 353
Rod Barajas    114 38%  54 18%  85 28% 48 16% 301
Brad Wilkerson 157 38%  90 22% 133 32% 37  9% 417

None of these are particularly surprising although Jim Edmonds profile is interesting. He combines a high fly ball and line drive percentage with a low popup percentage. Overall, players who hit more fly balls also tend to hit more popups.

The leaders in line drive percentage are…

                 F       L       G      P    Total
Lyle Overbay   110 24% 129 28% 206 45% 12  3% 457
Javier Valentin 49 29%  47 28%  59 35% 12  7% 167
Junior Spivey   40 22%  49 27%  77 42% 16  9% 182
Mike Young     175 29% 159 26% 225 37% 46  8% 605
Chris Gomez     66 22%  78 26% 135 45% 24  8% 303
Damian Miller   76 24%  78 25% 139 45% 19  6% 312
J.T. Snow       85 29%  72 25% 109 38% 23  8% 289
Craig Counsell  69 18%  94 25% 179 47% 36 10% 378
Doug Mirabelli  33 29%  28 25%  42 37% 11 10% 114
Brent Mayne     38 25%  37 24%  70 46%  7  5% 152

The average for everyone was 19%. Here there would seem to be surprises not the least of which is Brent Mayne and Damian Miller making the list. What this may say is that a significant number of hard hit balls, for example those that end up in the gaps for doubles and triples, are coded as fly balls.

Here are the leaders in ground balls with the average being 44.3%.

                  F       L       G      P   Total
Luis Castillo    75 15%  81 17% 319 65% 13 3% 488
Juan Brito       21 16%  20 15%  85 64%  6 5% 132
Ichiro Suzuki    99 16% 108 17% 406 64% 22 3% 635
Abraham Nunez    30 21%  17 12%  92 64%  5 3% 144
Y. Torrealba     37 26%  15 11%  84 60%  4 3% 140
Fernando Vina    22 22%  13 13%  60 59%  7 7% 102
Marlon Byrd      61 22%  40 14% 160 58% 15 5% 276
Cristian Guzman 118 23%  68 13% 293 58% 28 6% 507
Roberto Alomar   30 23%  20 15%  75 58%  5 4% 130
Juan Pierre     108 18% 116 19% 336 56% 35 6% 595

Here of course there are fewer surprises as you also find those with the lowest percentage of flyballs and popups. Royals fans won’t be surprised that Ken Harvey ranks among the leaders with 54% of his batted balls being on the ground.

And finally, the leaders in pop-outs against an average of 8.2%.

                F      L       G      P    Total
Tomas Perez    33 26% 25 20%  42 34% 25 20% 125
Todd Greene    49 31% 22 14%  56 35% 31 20% 158
Scott Spiezio  93 30% 56 18% 102 33% 60 19% 311
Dave Ross      35 34% 13 13%  36 35% 20 19% 104
Jose Valentin 108 35% 56 18%  93 30% 51 17% 308
Tony Batista  169 32% 91 17% 188 35% 88 16% 536
Eric Byrnes   133 29% 99 21% 155 34% 75 16% 462
Marcus Thames  39 31% 24 19%  41 33% 20 16% 124
Rod Barajas   114 38% 54 18%  85 28% 48 16% 301
Brook Fordyce  27 23% 20 17%  51 44% 18 16% 116

And since popups are converted into outs 98% of the time it’s not surprising that many of these players had pretty low batting averages in 2004.

For reference, here are the 345 players who put more than 100 balls in play in 2004. One interesting note is that despite the fact that Barry Bonds seemingly hits every ball on a line, Bonds’ profile of 30% fly balls, 23% line drives, 36% ground balls, and 11% line drives is not that atypical although he hit a greater percentage of line drives than normal.

         F  L  G  P  Total
Bobby Abreu 143 31% 113 24% 192 41% 17 4% 465
Edgardo Alfonzo 150 31% 113 23% 181 38% 38 8% 482
Roberto Alomar 30 23% 20 15% 75 58% 5 4% 130
S. Alomar Jr. 28 21% 19 14% 71 54% 14 11% 132
Moises Alou 191 36% 92 17% 208 39% 36 7% 527
Garret Anderson 109 29% 77 21% 159 43% 25 7% 370
Marlon Anderson 48 22% 34 16% 107 50% 27 13% 216
Rich Aurilia 109 33% 59 18% 131 40% 31 9% 330
Brad Ausmus 76 22% 61 18% 175 51% 33 10% 345
Jeff Bagwell 147 33% 81 18% 187 42% 29 7% 444
Paul Bako 25 23% 20 18% 58 53% 6 6% 109
Rod Barajas 114 38% 54 18% 85 28% 48 16% 301
Michael Barrett 105 26% 82 21% 192 48% 18 5% 397
Tony Batista 169 32% 91 17% 188 35% 88 16% 536
Danny Bautista 100 21% 98 21% 250 53% 25 5% 473
David Bell 125 27% 100 22% 188 41% 50 11% 463
Mark Bellhorn 112 32% 66 19% 145 42% 26 7% 349
Ron Belliard 136 27% 96 19% 227 45% 44 9% 503
Carlos Beltran 171 34% 71 14% 198 40% 58 12% 498
Adrian Beltre 146 28% 108 21% 210 41% 51 10% 515
Gary Bennett 45 24% 35 19% 93 49% 15 8% 188
Dave Berg 42 33% 27 21% 51 40% 9 7% 129
Lance Berkman 142 32% 91 20% 183 41% 32 7% 448
Angel Berroa 94 22% 78 19% 215 51% 31 7% 418
Larry Bigbie 89 24% 77 21% 198 54% 5 1% 369
Craig Biggio 155 29% 114 21% 211 40% 54 10% 534
Casey Blake 151 34% 76 17% 197 44% 26 6% 450
Hank Blalock 175 36% 105 22% 160 33% 42 9% 482
Henry Blanco 97 37% 32 12% 93 36% 37 14% 259
W. Bloomquist 39 28% 24 17% 59 42% 17 12% 139
Geoff Blum 80 28% 44 16% 131 46% 27 10% 282
Barry Bonds 99 30% 77 23% 122 36% 37 11% 335
Bret Boone 126 27% 64 14% 227 49% 43 9% 460
Joe Borchard 40 28% 29 20% 62 43% 13 9% 144
Milton Bradley 92 24% 75 19% 185 48% 35 9% 387
Juan Brito 21 16% 20 15% 85 64% 6 5% 132
Ben Broussard 97 30% 62 19% 129 40% 37 11% 325
Dee Brown 35 24% 29 20% 68 47% 14 10% 146
Jamie Burke 21 20% 21 20% 57 55% 5 5% 104
Jeromy Burnitz 135 32% 84 20% 163 39% 37 9% 419
Pat Burrell 109 34% 67 21% 117 36% 31 10% 324
Sean Burroughs 120 26% 85 18% 251 53% 14 3% 470
Marlon Byrd 61 22% 40 14% 160 58% 15 5% 276
Eric Byrnes 133 29% 99 21% 155 34% 75 16% 462
Jolbert Cabrera 80 28% 57 20% 119 42% 30 10% 286
Orlando Cabrera 158 28% 98 17% 258 45% 58 10% 572
Miguel Cairo 89 29% 58 19% 140 45% 25 8% 312
Mike Cameron 142 41% 56 16% 106 30% 44 13% 348
Jamey Carroll 52 26% 43 22% 98 49% 6 3% 199
Sean Casey 144 27% 130 24% 238 44% 29 5% 541
Kevin Cash 34 27% 19 15% 57 46% 14 11% 124
Vinny Castilla 160 33% 84 18% 193 40% 41 9% 478
Luis Castillo 75 15% 81 17% 319 65% 13 3% 488
Juan Castro 65 26% 44 18% 110 45% 28 11% 247
F. Catalanotto 62 28% 46 21% 101 46% 10 5% 219
Roger Cedeno 37 23% 38 24% 76 48% 9 6% 160
Eric Chavez 114 30% 73 19% 151 40% 42 11% 380
Endy Chavez 95 22% 71 16% 248 56% 27 6% 441
Raul Chavez 30 24% 21 17% 65 53% 7 6% 123
Hee Seop Choi 88 35% 44 18% 96 38% 22 9% 250
Alex Cintron 149 30% 87 17% 231 46% 36 7% 503
Brady Clark 85 28% 69 23% 125 41% 25 8% 304
Howie Clark 28 27% 15 15% 47 46% 12 12% 102
Tony Clark 40 25% 24 15% 86 53% 13 8% 163
Royce Clayton 90 21% 76 18% 237 56% 20 5% 423
Jeff Conine 158 35% 84 19% 163 36% 44 10% 449
Alex Cora 95 26% 60 16% 168 46% 41 11% 364
Craig Counsell 69 18% 94 25% 179 47% 36 10% 378
Carl Crawford 147 27% 103 19% 263 48% 32 6% 545
Joe Crede 140 34% 72 18% 142 35% 57 14% 411
Coco Crisp 95 23% 77 19% 202 49% 37 9% 411
Deivi Cruz 98 26% 69 19% 182 49% 21 6% 370
Jacob Cruz 25 24% 24 23% 52 50% 3 3% 104
Jose Cruz Jr. 154 36% 72 17% 154 36% 51 12% 431
Mike Cuddyer 91 34% 52 20% 102 39% 19 7% 264
Johnny Damon 137 25% 90 16% 267 49% 56 10% 550
Jeff Davanon 74 33% 47 21% 85 38% 15 7% 221
Ben Davis 49 34% 23 16% 62 43% 11 8% 145
Carlos Delgado 125 35% 66 19% 128 36% 35 10% 354
David Dellucci 83 34% 47 19% 96 39% 20 8% 246
Mark DeRosa 68 26% 55 21% 124 48% 14 5% 261
Einar Diaz 32 25% 26 20% 59 45% 13 10% 130
J.D. Drew 124 31% 68 17% 178 44% 34 8% 404
Adam Dunn 129 35% 88 24% 122 33% 34 9% 373
Erubiel Durazo 115 28% 97 24% 158 39% 39 10% 409
Ray Durham 123 30% 83 20% 170 42% 33 8% 409
Jermaine Dye 124 30% 81 20% 158 39% 45 11% 408
Damion Easley 55 29% 33 17% 77 41% 24 13% 189
David Eckstein 124 24% 104 20% 251 49% 31 6% 510
Jim Edmonds 134 38% 83 24% 117 33% 19 5% 353
J. Encarnacion 107 27% 63 16% 173 43% 56 14% 399
Morgan Ensberg 101 27% 69 19% 170 46% 28 8% 368
Darin Erstad 90 21% 76 18% 235 56% 20 5% 421
Alex Escobar 36 33% 12 11% 55 51% 5 5% 108
Johnny Estrada 119 30% 83 21% 170 43% 28 7% 400
Adam Everett 94 30% 50 16% 119 39% 46 15% 309
Carl Everett 55 23% 43 18% 115 48% 26 11% 239
Pedro Feliz 103 24% 79 19% 200 47% 41 10% 423
Robert Fick 72 38% 31 16% 66 34% 23 12% 192
Chone Figgins 148 32% 99 21% 180 39% 39 8% 466
Steve Finley 165 30% 108 20% 215 39% 58 11% 546
Cliff Floyd 96 32% 46 16% 127 43% 27 9% 296
Brook Fordyce 27 23% 20 17% 51 44% 18 16% 116
Julio Franco 56 22% 54 21% 138 54% 6 2% 254
Ryan Freel 85 21% 85 21% 197 49% 34 8% 401
Brad Fullmer 61 27% 36 16% 109 47% 24 10% 230
Rafael Furcal 124 27% 71 15% 230 49% 42 9% 467
Karim Garcia 71 34% 27 13% 93 44% 18 9% 209
N. Garciaparra 103 35% 60 20% 103 35% 27 9% 293
Jason Giambi 81 40% 18 9% 83 40% 23 11% 205
Jay Gibbons 85 30% 41 14% 129 45% 30 11% 285
Brian Giles 174 32% 116 22% 191 36% 56 10% 537
Marcus Giles 98 31% 61 20% 141 45% 12 4% 312
Keith Ginter 93 32% 66 23% 109 38% 20 7% 288
Doug Glanville 39 28% 23 17% 62 45% 15 11% 139
Troy Glaus 53 34% 27 17% 61 39% 15 10% 156
Ross Gload 58 29% 45 23% 83 42% 13 7% 199
Chris Gomez 66 22% 78 26% 135 45% 24 8% 303
Alex Gonzalez 57 26% 34 16% 108 49% 20 9% 219
Alex Gonzalez 148 35% 73 17% 145 34% 62 14% 428
Juan Gonzalez 32 29% 18 17% 45 41% 14 13% 109
Luis Gonzalez 107 33% 52 16% 114 35% 50 15% 323
Jason Grabowski 39 32% 28 23% 44 36% 12 10% 123
Tony Graffanino 61 26% 50 21% 106 45% 19 8% 236
Shawn Green 117 24% 77 16% 265 55% 19 4% 478
Todd Greene 49 31% 22 14% 56 35% 31 20% 158
Ben Grieve 41 22% 42 23% 90 49% 10 5% 183
Ken Griffey Jr. 82 35% 48 21% 84 36% 19 8% 233
Marquis Grissom 119 25% 84 17% 233 48% 47 10% 483
M. Grudzielanek 66 29% 46 20% 97 43% 16 7% 225
V. Guerrero 151 28% 123 23% 225 41% 47 9% 546
Carlos Guillen 128 29% 96 22% 184 42% 29 7% 437
Jose Guillen 126 26% 93 20% 227 48% 30 6% 476
Cristian Guzman 118 23% 68 13% 293 58% 28 6% 507
Travis Hafner 141 37% 65 17% 147 39% 24 6% 377
Jerry Hairston 68 26% 56 22% 100 38% 36 14% 260
Bill Hall 68 25% 62 23% 114 43% 23 9% 267
Toby Hall 113 31% 56 15% 150 41% 51 14% 370
Willie Harris 60 19% 67 22% 161 52% 23 7% 311
Ken Harvey 84 23% 68 18% 206 56% 10 3% 368
Scott Hatteberg 150 30% 98 19% 209 41% 51 10% 508
Wes Helms 63 29% 41 19% 95 44% 17 8% 216
Todd Helton 171 36% 115 24% 162 34% 33 7% 481
Jose Hernandez 52 35% 26 17% 68 46% 3 2% 149
Ramon Hernandez 88 26% 62 18% 155 45% 36 11% 341
Richard Hidalgo 137 34% 83 21% 133 33% 47 12% 400
Bobby Higginson 130 36% 62 17% 137 37% 37 10% 366
Bobby Hill 49 25% 39 20% 96 49% 11 6% 195
S.Hillenbrand 128 25% 114 22% 238 46% 38 7% 518
Eric Hinske 139 30% 84 18% 200 43% 44 9% 467
T.Hollandsworth 23 19% 25 21% 63 52% 10 8% 121
Orlando Hudson 114 29% 76 19% 184 47% 21 5% 395
Aubrey Huff 151 28% 98 18% 236 44% 46 9% 531
Torii Hunter 118 28% 53 13% 205 49% 44 10% 420
Raul Ibanez 121 29% 85 21% 179 43% 28 7% 413
Omar Infante 134 34% 86 22% 137 35% 36 9% 393
Brandon Inge 103 30% 66 19% 145 43% 26 8% 340
Cesar Izturis 141 24% 125 21% 292 49% 33 6% 591
Geoff Jenkins 132 28% 97 21% 213 45% 29 6% 471
Derek Jeter 151 28% 107 20% 260 48% 20 4% 538
D. Jimenez 131 28% 111 24% 195 42% 29 6% 466
Charles Johnson 66 31% 37 17% 97 45% 15 7% 215
Nick Johnson 49 25% 42 22% 92 47% 11 6% 194
Andruw Jones 120 28% 73 17% 200 47% 32 8% 425
Chipper Jones 123 32% 56 15% 182 48% 22 6% 383
Jacque Jones 107 25% 68 16% 239 56% 16 4% 430
Brian Jordan 52 29% 31 17% 78 43% 19 11% 180
Gabe Kapler 57 24% 38 16% 116 49% 27 11% 238
Austin Kearns 47 32% 22 15% 68 47% 9 6% 146
Jason Kendall 126 23% 107 20% 276 51% 28 5% 537
Adam Kennedy 117 32% 73 20% 145 39% 33 9% 368
Jeff Kent 176 39% 83 18% 165 36% 31 7% 455
Bobby Kielty 56 29% 40 21% 81 42% 15 8% 192
Ryan Klesko 91 27% 70 21% 144 43% 32 9% 337
Paul Konerko 139 30% 92 20% 192 42% 38 8% 461
Corey Koskie 131 41% 51 16% 113 35% 28 9% 323
Mark Kotsay 173 33% 118 22% 200 38% 38 7% 529
Mike Lamb 75 34% 42 19% 96 44% 5 2% 218
Jason Lane 38 36% 21 20% 36 34% 10 10% 105
Ray Lankford 46 31% 32 21% 57 38% 14 9% 149
Barry Larkin 78 25% 56 18% 162 53% 11 4% 307
Jason LaRue 82 29% 58 20% 122 43% 22 8% 284
Matt Lawton 140 27% 89 17% 252 49% 30 6% 511
Matt LeCroy 58 28% 31 15% 106 51% 11 5% 206
Ricky Ledee 32 25% 22 17% 66 51% 10 8% 130
Carlos Lee 180 35% 97 19% 164 32% 69 14% 510
Derrek Lee 176 37% 84 17% 195 41% 26 5% 481
Mike Lieberthal 130 32% 85 21% 139 34% 57 14% 411
Paul Lo Duca 138 28% 98 20% 222 46% 29 6% 487
Kenny Lofton 66 27% 46 19% 124 50% 12 5% 248
Terrence Long 69 29% 51 21% 111 46% 11 5% 242
Felipe Lopez 51 28% 42 23% 79 44% 9 5% 181
Javy Lopez 125 26% 94 19% 226 46% 43 9% 488
Mark Loretta 200 34% 138 23% 225 38% 25 4% 588
Mike Lowell 193 37% 110 21% 168 32% 52 10% 523
Julio Lugo 118 25% 96 20% 227 48% 29 6% 470
John Mabry 64 36% 33 18% 75 42% 8 4% 180
Jose Macias 39 25% 25 16% 77 50% 14 9% 155
Rob Mackowiak 101 26% 70 18% 177 46% 34 9% 382
Eli Marrero 66 33% 27 13% 90 44% 20 10% 203
Edgar Martinez 108 28% 77 20% 172 45% 24 6% 381
Ramon Martinez 75 34% 44 20% 87 39% 16 7% 222
Tino Martinez 123 31% 65 17% 163 42% 40 10% 391
Victor Martinez 162 35% 67 15% 187 41% 41 9% 457
Mike Matheny 79 26% 58 19% 149 49% 18 6% 304
Luis Matos 81 31% 38 14% 127 48% 17 6% 263
Gary Matthews 52 24% 48 22% 103 47% 16 7% 219
Brent Mayne 38 25% 37 24% 70 46% 7 5% 152
David McCarty 35 31% 12 11% 55 49% 10 9% 112
Q.McCracken 43 29% 29 20% 69 47% 6 4% 147
Joe McEwing 32 31% 17 16% 45 43% 10 10% 104
Mark McLemore 55 26% 43 20% 112 52% 4 2% 214
Adam Melhuse 41 25% 36 22% 78 47% 11 7% 166
Kevin Mench 131 35% 64 17% 141 37% 43 11% 379
Frank Menechino 63 29% 35 16% 96 44% 22 10% 216
Lou Merloni 48 32% 29 19% 62 41% 11 7% 150
Jason Michaels 80 36% 46 21% 88 40% 6 3% 220
D.Mientkiewicz 108 32% 59 18% 142 43% 25 7% 334
Kevin Millar 142 34% 78 18% 148 35% 55 13% 423
Damian Miller 76 24% 78 25% 139 45% 19 6% 312
Doug Mirabelli 33 29% 28 25% 42 37% 11 10% 114
Chad Moeller 62 25% 39 16% 118 48% 25 10% 244
Dustan Mohr 59 29% 37 18% 79 39% 26 13% 201
Ben Molina 90 30% 44 14% 151 50% 20 7% 305
Jose Molina 45 30% 27 18% 69 47% 7 5% 148
Raul Mondesi 30 29% 23 23% 36 35% 13 13% 102
Craig Monroe 87 23% 84 23% 167 45% 33 9% 371
Melvin Mora 142 32% 87 19% 180 40% 39 9% 448
Bill Mueller 106 30% 69 20% 143 41% 31 9% 349
Eric Munson 78 34% 42 18% 86 37% 24 10% 230
Phil Nevin 125 29% 87 20% 190 44% 28 7% 430
David Newhan 75 26% 56 19% 142 48% 21 7% 294
Trot Nixon 47 37% 23 18% 47 37% 10 8% 127
Abraham Nunez 30 21% 17 12% 92 64% 5 3% 144
Abraham Nunez 55 26% 36 17% 100 47% 21 10% 212
Jose Offerman 50 35% 30 21% 49 35% 12 9% 141
John Olerud 105 28% 75 20% 164 44% 25 7% 369
Miguel Olivo 64 30% 27 13% 101 47% 21 10% 213
Magglio Ordonez 38 21% 31 17% 91 50% 21 12% 181
David Ortiz 180 39% 91 20% 155 34% 31 7% 457
Lyle Overbay 110 24% 129 28% 206 45% 12 3% 457
O.Palmeiro 36 32% 19 17% 44 39% 14 12% 113
Rafael Palmeiro 180 36% 96 19% 167 34% 55 11% 498
Corey Patterson 125 29% 73 17% 176 41% 59 14% 433
Jay Payton 111 27% 77 19% 166 41% 51 13% 405
Carlos Pena 121 36% 57 17% 137 40% 24 7% 339
Wily Mo Pena 51 22% 46 20% 115 50% 16 7% 228
Eddie Perez 40 28% 31 22% 56 39% 15 11% 142
Neifi Perez 79 24% 66 20% 146 45% 34 10% 325
Tomas Perez 33 26% 25 20% 42 34% 25 20% 125
Timo Perez 68 27% 37 15% 118 46% 32 13% 255
Herb Perry 28 24% 19 16% 64 55% 6 5% 117
Josh Phelps 72 26% 43 15% 151 54% 13 5% 279
Jason Phillips 102 31% 49 15% 148 46% 25 8% 324
Mike Piazza 112 29% 69 18% 165 43% 34 9% 380
Juan Pierre 108 18% 116 19% 336 56% 35 6% 595
A.J. Pierzynski 101 23% 90 20% 202 45% 54 12% 447
Scott Podsednik 139 27% 95 19% 243 48% 32 6% 509
Placido Polanco 111 24% 100 21% 228 49% 29 6% 468
Jorge Posada 94 26% 60 17% 188 53% 16 4% 358
Albert Pujols 172 31% 99 18% 228 42% 49 9% 548
Aramis Ramirez 165 34% 103 21% 174 35% 50 10% 492
Manny Ramirez 161 36% 79 18% 189 42% 22 5% 451
Joe Randa 126 30% 85 20% 162 39% 43 10% 416
Tike Redman 105 22% 82 17% 267 55% 30 6% 484
Mike Redmond 55 25% 46 21% 103 47% 15 7% 219
Pokey Reese 55 31% 32 18% 74 41% 19 11% 180
Desi Relaford 99 30% 53 16% 149 46% 25 8% 326
Edgar Renteria 132 26% 115 23% 240 47% 23 5% 510
Luis Rivas 89 32% 49 17% 123 44% 20 7% 281
Juan Rivera 77 22% 69 20% 172 50% 28 8% 346
Brian Roberts 177 33% 120 22% 211 39% 29 5% 537
Dave Roberts 67 28% 40 17% 122 51% 12 5% 241
Alex Rodriguez 142 30% 76 16% 219 46% 39 8% 476
Ivan Rodriguez 123 28% 95 22% 202 46% 20 5% 440
Scott Rolen 150 36% 95 23% 124 30% 46 11% 415
Jimmy Rollins 161 28% 126 22% 241 42% 41 7% 569
Dave Ross 35 34% 13 13% 36 35% 20 19% 104
Aaron Rowand 97 25% 72 18% 182 47% 39 10% 390
Tim Salmon 53 36% 31 21% 51 34% 14 9% 149
Alex Sanchez 48 21% 52 23% 119 53% 6 3% 225
Rey Sanchez 57 22% 55 21% 134 52% 12 5% 258
Reggie Sanders 101 31% 72 22% 127 38% 31 9% 331
Benito Santiago 45 32% 24 17% 62 44% 11 8% 142
Brian Schneider 89 24% 80 21% 182 49% 24 6% 375
Marco Scutaro 111 28% 75 19% 170 44% 34 9% 390
Gary Sheffield 135 27% 91 18% 208 42% 64 13% 498
Ruben Sierra 71 28% 51 20% 107 41% 29 11% 258
Randall Simon 39 23% 22 13% 94 54% 18 10% 173
Jason Smith 38 33% 23 20% 48 42% 5 4% 114
J.T. Snow 85 29% 72 25% 109 38% 23 8% 289
Alfonso Soriano 187 38% 104 21% 164 33% 37 8% 492
Sammy Sosa 105 30% 62 18% 152 44% 29 8% 348
Shane Spencer 50 34% 26 17% 66 44% 7 5% 149
Scott Spiezio 93 30% 56 18% 102 33% 60 19% 311
Junior Spivey 40 22% 49 27% 77 42% 16 9% 182
Matt Stairs 97 28% 53 15% 172 49% 27 8% 349
Shannon Stewart 102 30% 65 19% 147 44% 22 7% 336
Chris Stynes 33 24% 19 14% 69 50% 16 12% 137
B.J. Surhoff 81 27% 64 22% 126 42% 26 9% 297
Ichiro Suzuki 99 16% 108 17% 406 64% 22 3% 635
Mark Sweeney 45 35% 23 18% 48 37% 13 10% 129
Mike Sweeney 124 34% 70 19% 135 37% 40 11% 369
So Taguchi 35 22% 33 21% 78 50% 10 6% 156
Miguel Tejada 154 26% 119 20% 278 47% 42 7% 593
Marcus Thames 39 31% 24 19% 41 33% 20 16% 124
Frank Thomas 73 40% 41 22% 54 29% 16 9% 184
Jim Thome 128 35% 73 20% 137 37% 30 8% 368
Y. Torrealba 37 26% 15 11% 84 60% 4 3% 140
Michael Tucker 114 32% 74 21% 146 41% 19 5% 353
Juan Uribe 120 29% 74 18% 155 38% 58 14% 407
Eric Valent 59 28% 43 20% 87 41% 21 10% 210
Jose Valentin 108 35% 56 18% 93 30% 51 17% 308
Javier Valentin 49 29% 47 28% 59 35% 12 7% 167
Jason Varitek 102 30% 69 20% 137 41% 29 9% 337
Robin Ventura 44 36% 18 15% 48 39% 12 10% 122
Jose Vidro 81 22% 76 21% 191 52% 20 5% 368
Fernando Vina 22 22% 13 13% 60 59% 7 7% 102
Jose Vizcaino 76 24% 60 19% 165 52% 19 6% 320
Omar Vizquel 128 25% 106 21% 218 43% 53 10% 505
Larry Walker 51 25% 34 17% 96 48% 20 10% 201
Todd Walker 101 31% 66 20% 132 41% 25 8% 324
Daryle Ward 75 30% 47 19% 95 38% 34 14% 251
Vernon Wells 130 29% 81 18% 201 44% 42 9% 454
Jayson Werth 66 32% 48 24% 69 34% 21 10% 204
Rondell White 97 26% 54 14% 181 48% 42 11% 374
Ty Wigginton 117 28% 83 20% 186 45% 26 6% 412
Brad Wilkerson 157 38% 90 22% 133 32% 37 9% 417
Bernie Williams 127 27% 93 20% 205 44% 41 9% 466
Craig Wilson 115 29% 68 17% 185 47% 27 7% 395
Dan Wilson 84 32% 60 23% 114 43% 8 3% 266
Enrique Wilson 66 30% 35 16% 110 49% 12 5% 223
Jack Wilson 148 26% 110 19% 265 46% 54 9% 577
Preston Wilson 46 30% 22 14% 70 46% 15 10% 153
Vance Wilson 49 36% 20 15% 57 42% 9 7% 135
Randy Winn 122 23% 101 19% 277 53% 27 5% 527
Dewayne Wise 26 20% 29 22% 61 47% 14 11% 130
Tony Womack 118 24% 104 21% 234 48% 28 6% 484
Chris Woodward 56 33% 31 18% 65 38% 17 10% 169
Dan Wright 80 35% 45 20% 80 35% 21 9% 226
Dmitri Young 85 26% 70 22% 144 45% 23 7% 322
Eric Young 80 26% 70 23% 127 41% 34 11% 311
Mike Young 175 29% 159 26% 225 37% 46 8% 605
Gregg Zaun 77 28% 58 21% 125 45% 17 6% 277
Todd Zeile 73 28% 38 15% 128 49% 21 8% 260