Announcers are always talking about the importance of scoring the runner from third with less than two outs. So how often do major league teams convert this opportunity and are some players more proficient in these situations?
To attempt to answer those questions I looked at play by play data for the 2003 and 2004 seasons. Specifically I looked at all situations where the following were true
- There was at least a runner on third
- There were less than two outs
- The play ended the batter’s plate appearance (to make sure and not count wild pitches, balks, passed balls, and pick off errors)
What I found was that there were 21,073 opportunities during those two years and that 51.7% of the time the runner scored from third.
The leaders for those two seasons (with more than 50 opportunities) were:
Opp Runs Pct
Crede Joe 57 41 72%
Lawton Matt 56 40 71%
Cruz Deivi 54 36 67%
Cabrera Orlando 71 47 66%
Tejada Miguel 115 76 66%
Matsui Hideki 93 61 66%
Anderson Garret 71 46 65%
Anderson Marlon 51 33 65%
Cintron Alex 51 33 65%
Renteria Edgar 97 62 64%
Casey Sean 72 46 64%
Damon Johnny 72 46 64%
Sheffield Gary 119 76 64%
Millar Kevin 70 44 63%
Stewart Shannon 59 37 63%
Loretta Mark 67 42 63%
Conine Jeff 75 47 63%
Baldelli Rocco 83 52 63%
Ramirez Aramis 72 45 63%
This is an interesting list and includes both "RBI men" such as Miguel Tejada, Garret Anderson, Gary Sheffield, and Hideki Matsui as well as some hitters you wouldn’t think of that way at all including Deivi Cruz, Orlando Cabrera, and Alex Cintron.
Those at the bottom of the list were:
Opp Runs Pct
Crisp Coco 59 25 42%
Wilson Craig 60 25 42%
Beltre Adrian 70 28 40%
Burrell Pat 90 35 39%
Ramirez Manny 99 38 38%
Sexson Richie 68 26 38%
Kotsay Mark 55 21 38%
Burnitz Jeromy 56 21 38%
Bonds Barry 68 25 37%
Drew J.D. 55 20 36%
Sanders Reggie 61 22 36%
Valentin Jose 54 19 35%
Hernandez Jose 57 20 35%
Dunn Adam 69 24 35%
Helms Wes 58 20 34%
What’s interesting about this of course is that players you would normally think of as run producers don’t seem to fair very well including Barry Bonds, J.D. Drew, Manny Ramirez, Adrian Beltre, and Richie Sexson.
There are two reasons for this. First, the players at the bottom are those that tend to draw more walks and probably do so at a greater ratio in situations such as these by being pitched around. Since walks were included in the opportunities the percentages will tend to be lower for those types of players. Re-running the numbers and excluding walks the bottom bunch are:
Opp Runs Pct
Soriano Alfonso 65 31 48%
Gonzalez Alex 63 30 48%
Wigginton Ty 63 30 48%
Wilson Craig 51 24 47%
Cameron Mike 56 26 46%
Castilla Vinny 74 34 46%
Jones Andruw 82 37 45%
Aurilia Rich 51 23 45%
Burrell Pat 76 33 43%
Beltre Adrian 63 27 43%
Dunn Adam 54 23 43%
Sexson Richie 57 24 42%
Sanders Reggie 54 22 41%
Hernandez Jose 50 20 40%
Helms Wes 51 19 37%
While this list still includes a couple players with high walk rates such as Adam Dunn and Richie Sexson, it now makes clear the second reason – these players also have high strikeout rates (Mark Bellhorn doesn’t make the list because he had only 47 opportunities although he scored the runner 28 times for a respectable percentage of 59.6%). By the way, when excluding walks Barry Bonds opportunities drop from 68 to 27 but his percentage skyrockets from 37% to 81%).
Overall, when walks are excluded the total number of opportunities drops to 18,793 and the scoring percentage climbs to 56.3%. Here are the leaders with walks excluded:
Opp Runs Pct
Sheffield Gary 100 76 76%
Crede Joe 55 40 73%
Lawton Matt 51 37 73%
Renteria Edgar 86 62 72%
Helton Todd 76 54 71%
Casey Sean 65 46 71%
Ramirez Aramis 64 45 70%
Tejada Miguel 107 75 70%
Anderson Garret 66 46 70%
Guillen Carlos 62 43 69%
Cruz Deivi 52 36 69%
Huff Aubrey 81 56 69%
Beltran Carlos 60 41 68%
Cabrera Orlando 68 46 68%
Damon Johnny 68 46 68%
The real question, however, is whether the ability to plate a runner from third with less than two outs is an actual skill or whether this is a manifestation of small sample sizes and/or luck. To try and find out I took a look at the 87 players who had at least 25 opportunities in each season (excluding walks). Running a regression on the percentage of runners driven in yielded a correlation coefficient of .321 – not random but not exactly strong either.
Of course, the first thought that comes to mind is that there should be a correlation from year to year since the scoring rate should be tied to batting average. After all, players with higher batting averages will tend to drive in more runners from third with less than two outs. In a previous study, I looked at the variability of batting average and found that the correlation was .337, essentially the same as that for driving in runners from third. So is this totally dependant on batting average?
In order to isolate the effect of batting average I calculated the number of runners driven in over and above what would be expected based on batting average alone. In other words, for each season I multiplied the player’s batting average by the number of opportunities to calculate the number of opportunities that the player was “expected” to cash in. Of course, this isn’t a true measure of the number of runs expected since all players will also drive in runs from third on fly balls and ground balls – which is the ability we’re trying to measure – here I’m simply trying to establish a baseline. I then subtracted this from the actual number they did drive in. The leaders in this new category of Runs Over Expected from Third (ROE3) were:
Opp Runs Pct ROE3
Sheffield Gary 100 76 76% 45.0
Tejada Miguel 107 75 70% 43.0
Renteria Edgar 86 62 72% 35.2
Delgado Carlos 85 57 67% 32.6
Batista Tony 85 52 61% 31.8
Huff Aubrey 81 56 69% 31.5
Rodriguez Ivan 84 54 64% 27.8
Giles Brian 81 51 63% 27.4
Helton Todd 76 54 71% 27.1
Cabrera Orlando 68 46 68% 26.7
Ramirez Aramis 64 45 70% 26.4
Crede Joe 55 40 73% 26.3
Damon Johnny 68 46 68% 26.3
Casey Sean 65 46 71% 25.9
Conine Jeff 68 45 66% 25.8
You can see that many of these players are the same ones in the leaders by percentage but just rearranged a bit and heavily sorted by opportunities.
Once again those at the bottom are dominated by players who barely make the 50 opportunity threshold over the two years.
Opp Runs Pct ROE3
Edmonds Jim 54 28 52% 12.3
Rivas Luis 50 25 50% 12.1
Stairs Matt 50 25 50% 11.3
Overbay Lyle 54 27 50% 11.1
Wilson Craig 51 24 47% 10.6
Crisp Coco 51 25 49% 10.5
Bautista Danny 52 25 48% 10.3
Figgins Chone 50 25 50% 10.2
Dunn Adam 54 23 43% 9.6
Aurilia Rich 51 23 45% 9.6
Beltre Adrian 63 27 43% 9.0
Sexson Richie 57 24 42% 8.8
Hernandez Jose 50 20 40% 8.2
Sanders Reggie 54 22 41% 7.3
Helms Wes 51 19 37% 5.7
A more fair comparison would to calculate the rate of course by dividing the ROE3 by opportunities adjusted for the number of runs that were expected to come up with a runs from third rate (R3Pct). To illustrate consider Gary Sheffield who had drove in 76 runners (45 more than expected) based on his batting average in 100 opportunities. His R3Pct would then be calculated as:
Expected Scores = 76-45 = 31
Opportunities beyond expected scores = 100-31=69
R3Pct = 45/69=.652
In other words, Sheffield came through 65.2% of the time when his batting average is taken into account.
The leaders in R3Pct are:
Opp Runs Pct ROE3 R3Pct
Sheffield Gary 100 76 76% 45.0 0.652
Crede Joe 55 40 73% 26.3 0.637
Lawton Matt 51 37 73% 23.4 0.626
Renteria Edgar 86 62 72% 35.2 0.595
Ramirez Aramis 64 45 70% 26.4 0.581
Cruz Deivi 52 36 69% 21.9 0.578
Casey Sean 65 46 71% 25.9 0.577
Tejada Miguel 107 75 70% 43.0 0.574
Anderson Garret 66 46 70% 25.6 0.562
Guillen Carlos 62 43 69% 24.3 0.561
Huff Aubrey 81 56 69% 31.5 0.558
Beltran Carlos 60 41 68% 23.5 0.552
Helton Todd 76 54 71% 27.1 0.552
Palmeiro Rafael 63 42 67% 25.7 0.550
Cabrera Orlando 68 46 68% 26.7 0.549
Those at the bottom include:
Opp Runs Pct ROE3 R3Pct
Crisp Coco 51 25 49% 10.5 0.287
Wilson Craig 51 24 47% 10.6 0.281
Bautista Danny 52 25 48% 10.3 0.277
Soriano Alfonso 65 31 48% 12.6 0.270
Burrell Pat 76 33 43% 15.5 0.264
Castilla Vinny 74 34 46% 13.8 0.256
Aurilia Rich 51 23 45% 9.6 0.255
Ramirez Manny 76 37 49% 12.9 0.248
Jones Andruw 82 37 45% 14.7 0.246
Dunn Adam 54 23 43% 9.6 0.237
Hernandez Jose 50 20 40% 8.2 0.214
Sexson Richie 57 24 42% 8.8 0.210
Beltre Adrian 63 27 43% 9.0 0.199
Sanders Reggie 54 22 41% 7.3 0.185
Helms Wes 51 19 37% 5.7 0.151
Poor Wes Helms can’t seem to get out of the bottom no matter what adjustments are made.
So now with R3Pct in place we can re-run the regression based on R3Pct to see if we get a clearer picture of what is going on here. When I did so the result was .340, a slight improvement over using batting average alone but still not a strong correlation.
My conclusion would be that players do have some control over driving in runners from third with less than two outs but that ability is closely tied to other more obvious abilities such as hitting fly balls, hitting ground balls to the right side of the infield, and not striking out. These other abilities are not known to be situation dependant and so it’s doubtful that players have much of an ability to bring the runner in from third over and above what their other abilities give them.
It’s also interesting to look at ROE3 in the aggregate for teams. For 2004 the numbers were:
Opp Runs Pct ROE3 R3Pct
CHA 263 167 63% 96.6 0.502
PIT 295 176 60% 99.2 0.455
SFN 344 207 60% 114.0 0.454
MIN 298 178 60% 98.8 0.452
TBA 339 201 59% 113.5 0.451
DET 316 189 60% 103.0 0.448
CLE 327 195 60% 104.8 0.443
ANA 366 219 60% 115.6 0.440
BAL 375 223 59% 117.5 0.436
TEX 305 178 58% 97.0 0.433
NYA 346 200 58% 107.2 0.423
ATL 314 180 57% 95.3 0.416
SLN 362 209 58% 108.4 0.415
LAN 296 167 56% 89.6 0.410
SEA 331 186 56% 96.7 0.400
BOS 359 202 56% 100.8 0.391
PHI 326 179 55% 92.1 0.385
KCA 297 161 54% 84.2 0.382
SDN 371 203 55% 101.7 0.377
MIL 299 158 53% 83.9 0.373
CHN 285 154 54% 77.6 0.372
OAK 294 159 54% 79.7 0.371
FLO 304 163 54% 82.8 0.370
TOR 312 166 53% 84.9 0.368
HOU 349 184 53% 90.9 0.355
ARI 295 151 51% 76.5 0.347
MON 279 142 51% 72.6 0.346
COL 289 151 52% 71.7 0.342
CIN 303 150 50% 74.2 0.327
NYN 288 137 48% 65.4 0.302
It’s important to remember when looking at the team aggregates, however, that these do not reflect overall how successful a team was in scoring the runner from third but only the aggregation of all opportunities for a team’s players to do so.
To illustrate the difference consider the situation where Corey Patterson triples to lead off the first inning. Derrek Lee then has a chance to score the runner but instead pops up. Nomar Garciapara then hits a grounder to the right side and Patterson scores. In this scenario the Cubs would be credited with a 50% efficiency since they had two chances and delivered once. However, you could also say that Cubs were 100% successful since they did actually score the single runner Patterson in the inning. Overall, then the odds of scoring a runner from third are greater than these percentages. In taking a look at my Big League Manager you can see that from 1999-2002 teams had the following scoring probabilities.
Outs Runners Pct
0 3 86.4
0 23 85.6
0 123 87.2
1 3 66.2
1 23 69.5
1 123 67.0
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